Theory m3_ds

(*******************************************************************************

  Project: Development of Security Protocols by Refinement

  Module:  Key_establish/m3_ds.thy (Isabelle/HOL 2016-1)
  ID:      $Id: m3_ds.thy 132890 2016-12-24 10:25:57Z csprenge $
  Authors: Christoph Sprenger, ETH Zurich <sprenger@inf.ethz.ch>
           Ivano Somaini, ETH Zurich <somainii@student.ethz.ch>

  Key distribution protocols
  Level 3: Denning-Sacco protocol

  Copyright (c) 2009-2016 Christoph Sprenger, Ivano Somaini
  Licence: LGPL

*******************************************************************************)

section ‹Denning-Sacco protocol (L3)›

theory m3_ds imports m2_ds "../Refinement/Message"
begin

text ‹
We model the Denning-Sacco protocol:
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
  \mathrm{M1.} & A \rightarrow S: & A, B \\ 
  \mathrm{M2.} & S \rightarrow A: & \{Kab, B, Ts, Na, \{Kab, A, Ts\}_{Kbs} \}_{Kas} \\
  \mathrm{M3.} & A \rightarrow B: & \{Kab, A, Ts\}_{Kbs}
\end{array}
\]
›

text ‹Proof tool configuration. Avoid annoying automatic unfolding of
‹dom›.›

declare domIff [simp, iff del]


(******************************************************************************)
subsection ‹Setup›
(******************************************************************************)

text ‹Now we can define the initial key knowledge.›

overloading ltkeySetup' ≡ ltkeySetup begin
definition ltkeySetup_def: "ltkeySetup' ≡ {(sharK C, A) | C A. A = C ∨ A = Sv}"
end

lemma corrKey_shrK_bad [simp]: "corrKey = shrK`bad"
by (auto simp add: keySetup_def ltkeySetup_def corrKey_def)


(******************************************************************************)
subsection ‹State›
(******************************************************************************)

text ‹The secure channels are star-shaped to/from the server.  Therefore,
we have only one agent in the relation.›

record m3_state = "m1_state" +
  IK :: "msg set"                                ― ‹intruder knowledge›


text ‹Observable state:
@{term "runs"}, @{term "leak"}, @{term "clk"}, and @{term "cache"}.›

type_synonym
  m3_obs = "m2_obs"

definition
  m3_obs :: "m3_state ⇒ m3_obs" where
  "m3_obs s ≡ ⦇ runs = runs s, leak = leak s, clk = clk s ⦈"

type_synonym
  m3_pred = "m3_state set"

type_synonym
  m3_trans = "(m3_state × m3_state) set"


(******************************************************************************)
subsection ‹Events›
(******************************************************************************)

text ‹Protocol events.›

definition     ― ‹by @{term "A"}, refines @{term "m2_step1"}›
  m3_step1 :: "[rid_t, agent, agent] ⇒ m3_trans"
where
  "m3_step1 Ra A B ≡ {(s, s1).
    ― ‹guards:›
    Ra ∉ dom (runs s) ∧                                 ― ‹‹Ra› is fresh›

    ― ‹actions:›
    s1 = s⦇
      runs := (runs s)(Ra ↦ (Init, [A, B], [])),
      IK := insert ⦃Agent A, Agent B⦄ (IK s)        ― ‹send ‹M1››
    ⦈
  }"

definition     ― ‹by @{term "B"}, refines @{term "m2_step2"}›
  m3_step2 :: "[rid_t, agent, agent] ⇒ m3_trans"
where
  "m3_step2 ≡ m1_step2"

definition     ― ‹by @{text "Server"}, refines @{term m2_step3}›
  m3_step3 :: "[rid_t, agent, agent, key, time] ⇒ m3_trans"
where
  "m3_step3 Rs A B Kab Ts ≡ {(s, s1).
    ― ‹guards:›
    Rs ∉ dom (runs s) ∧                           ― ‹fresh server run›
    Kab = sesK (Rs$sk) ∧                          ― ‹fresh session key›

    ⦃Agent A, Agent B⦄ ∈ IK s ∧                   ― ‹recv ‹M1››
    Ts = clk s ∧                                  ― ‹fresh timestamp›

    ― ‹actions:›
    ― ‹record session key and send ‹M2››
    s1 = s⦇
      runs := (runs s)(Rs ↦ (Serv, [A, B], [aNum Ts])),
      IK := insert (Crypt (shrK A)                        ― ‹send ‹M2››
                     ⦃Key Kab, Agent B, Number Ts,
                        Crypt (shrK B) ⦃Key Kab, Agent A, Number Ts⦄⦄)
                   (IK s)
    ⦈
  }"

definition     ― ‹by @{term "A"}, refines @{term m2_step4}›
  m3_step4 :: "[rid_t, agent, agent, key, time, msg] ⇒ m3_trans"
where
  "m3_step4 Ra A B Kab Ts X ≡ {(s, s1).

     ― ‹guards:›
     runs s Ra = Some (Init, [A, B], []) ∧           ― ‹key not yet recv'd›

     Crypt (shrK A)                                  ― ‹recv ‹M2››
       ⦃Key Kab, Agent B, Number Ts, X⦄ ∈ IK s ∧

     ― ‹check freshness of session key›
     clk s < Ts + Ls ∧

     ― ‹actions:›
     ― ‹record session key and send ‹M3››
     s1 = s⦇
       runs := (runs s)(Ra ↦ (Init, [A, B], [aKey Kab, aNum Ts])),
       IK := insert X (IK s)                         ― ‹send ‹M3››
     ⦈
  }"

definition     ― ‹by @{term "B"}, refines @{term m2_step5}›
  m3_step5 :: "[rid_t, agent, agent, key, time] ⇒ m3_trans"
where
  "m3_step5 Rb A B Kab Ts ≡ {(s, s1).
     ― ‹guards:›
     runs s Rb = Some (Resp, [A, B], []) ∧             ― ‹key not yet recv'd›

     Crypt (shrK B) ⦃Key Kab, Agent A, Number Ts⦄ ∈ IK s ∧    ― ‹recv ‹M3››

     ― ‹ensure freshness of session key; replays with fresh authenticator ok!›
     clk s < Ts + Ls ∧

     ― ‹actions:›
     ― ‹record session key›
     s1 = s⦇
       runs := (runs s)(Rb ↦ (Resp, [A, B], [aKey Kab, aNum Ts]))
     ⦈
  }"


text ‹Clock tick event›

definition   ― ‹refines @{term "m2_tick"}›
  m3_tick :: "time ⇒ m3_trans"
where
  "m3_tick ≡ m1_tick"


text ‹Session key compromise.›

definition     ― ‹refines @{term m2_leak}›
  m3_leak :: "rid_t ⇒ m3_trans"
where
  "m3_leak Rs ≡ {(s, s1).
    ― ‹guards:›
    Rs ∈ dom (runs s) ∧
    fst (the (runs s Rs)) = Serv ∧         ― ‹compromise server run ‹Rs››

    ― ‹actions:›
    ― ‹record session key as leaked and add it to intruder knowledge›
    s1 = s⦇ leak := insert (sesK (Rs$sk)) (leak s),
            IK := insert (Key (sesK (Rs$sk))) (IK s) ⦈
  }"


text ‹Intruder fake event. The following "Dolev-Yao" event generates all
intruder-derivable messages.›

definition     ― ‹refines @{term "m2_fake"}›
  m3_DY_fake :: "m3_trans"
where
  "m3_DY_fake ≡ {(s, s1).

     ― ‹actions:›
     s1 = s⦇ IK := synth (analz (IK s)) ⦈       ― ‹take DY closure›
  }"


(******************************************************************************)
subsection ‹Transition system›
(******************************************************************************)

definition
  m3_init :: "m3_pred"
where
  "m3_init ≡ { ⦇
     runs = Map.empty,
     leak = shrK`bad,
     clk = 0,
     IK = Key`shrK`bad
  ⦈ }"

definition
  m3_trans :: "m3_trans" where
  "m3_trans ≡ (⋃A B Ra Rb Rs Kab Ts T X.
     m3_step1 Ra A B ∪
     m3_step2 Rb A B ∪
     m3_step3 Rs A B Kab Ts ∪
     m3_step4 Ra A B Kab Ts X ∪
     m3_step5 Rb A B Kab Ts ∪
     m3_tick T ∪
     m3_leak Rs ∪
     m3_DY_fake ∪
     Id
  )"

definition
  m3 :: "(m3_state, m3_obs) spec" where
  "m3 ≡ ⦇
    init = m3_init,
    trans = m3_trans,
    obs = m3_obs
  ⦈"

lemmas m3_loc_defs =
  m3_def m3_init_def m3_trans_def m3_obs_def
  m3_step1_def m3_step2_def m3_step3_def m3_step4_def m3_step5_def
  m3_tick_def m3_leak_def m3_DY_fake_def

lemmas m3_defs = m3_loc_defs m2_defs


(******************************************************************************)
subsection ‹Invariants›
(******************************************************************************)

text ‹Specialized injection that we can apply more aggressively.›

lemmas analz_Inj_IK = analz.Inj [where H="IK s" for s]
lemmas parts_Inj_IK = parts.Inj [where H="IK s" for s]

declare parts_Inj_IK [dest!]

declare analz_into_parts [dest]


subsubsection ‹inv1: Secrecy of pre-distributed shared keys›
(******************************************************************************)

definition
  m3_inv1_lkeysec :: "m3_pred"
where
  "m3_inv1_lkeysec ≡ {s. ∀C.
     (Key (shrK C) ∈ parts (IK s) ⟶ C ∈ bad) ∧
     (C ∈ bad ⟶ Key (shrK C) ∈ IK s)
  }"

lemmas m3_inv1_lkeysecI = m3_inv1_lkeysec_def [THEN setc_def_to_intro, rule_format]
lemmas m3_inv1_lkeysecE [elim] = m3_inv1_lkeysec_def [THEN setc_def_to_elim, rule_format]
lemmas m3_inv1_lkeysecD = m3_inv1_lkeysec_def [THEN setc_def_to_dest, rule_format]


text ‹Invariance proof.›

lemma PO_m3_inv1_lkeysec_init [iff]:
  "init m3 ⊆ m3_inv1_lkeysec"
by (auto simp add: m3_defs intro!: m3_inv1_lkeysecI)

lemma PO_m3_inv1_lkeysec_trans [iff]:
  "{m3_inv1_lkeysec} trans m3 {> m3_inv1_lkeysec}"
by (auto simp add: PO_hoare_defs m3_defs intro!: m3_inv1_lkeysecI)
   (auto dest!: Body)

lemma PO_m3_inv1_lkeysec [iff]: "reach m3 ⊆ m3_inv1_lkeysec"
by (rule inv_rule_incr) (fast+)


text ‹Useful simplifier lemmas›

lemma m3_inv1_lkeysec_for_parts [simp]:
  "⟦ s ∈ m3_inv1_lkeysec ⟧ ⟹ Key (shrK C) ∈ parts (IK s) ⟷ C ∈ bad"
by auto

lemma m3_inv1_lkeysec_for_analz [simp]:
  "⟦ s ∈ m3_inv1_lkeysec ⟧ ⟹ Key (shrK C) ∈ analz (IK s) ⟷ C ∈ bad"
by auto


subsubsection ‹inv2: Ticket shape for honestly encrypted M2›
(******************************************************************************)

definition
  m3_inv2_ticket :: "m3_pred"
where
  "m3_inv2_ticket ≡ {s. ∀A B T K X.
     A ∉ bad ⟶
     Crypt (shrK A) ⦃Key K, Agent B, Number T, X⦄ ∈ parts (IK s) ⟶
       X = Crypt (shrK B) ⦃Key K, Agent A, Number T⦄ ∧ K ∈ range sesK
  }"

lemmas m3_inv2_ticketI = m3_inv2_ticket_def [THEN setc_def_to_intro, rule_format]
lemmas m3_inv2_ticketE [elim] = m3_inv2_ticket_def [THEN setc_def_to_elim, rule_format]
lemmas m3_inv2_ticketD = m3_inv2_ticket_def [THEN setc_def_to_dest, rule_format, rotated -1]


text ‹Invariance proof.›

lemma PO_m3_inv2_ticket_init [iff]:
  "init m3 ⊆ m3_inv2_ticket"
by (auto simp add: m3_defs intro!: m3_inv2_ticketI)

lemma PO_m3_inv2_ticket_trans [iff]:
  "{m3_inv2_ticket ∩ m3_inv1_lkeysec} trans m3 {> m3_inv2_ticket}"
apply (auto simp add: PO_hoare_defs m3_defs intro!: m3_inv2_ticketI)
apply (auto dest: m3_inv2_ticketD)
― ‹2 subgoals, from step4›
apply (drule parts_cut, drule Body, auto dest: m3_inv2_ticketD)+
done

lemma PO_m3_inv2_ticket [iff]: "reach m3 ⊆ m3_inv2_ticket"
by (rule inv_rule_incr) (auto del: subsetI)


subsubsection ‹inv3: Session keys not used to encrypt other session keys›
(******************************************************************************)

text ‹Session keys are not used to encrypt other keys. Proof requires
generalization to sets of session keys.›

definition
  m3_inv3_sesK_compr :: "m3_pred"
where
  "m3_inv3_sesK_compr ≡ {s. ∀K KK.
     KK ⊆ range sesK ⟶
     (Key K ∈ analz (Key`KK ∪ (IK s))) = (K ∈ KK ∨ Key K ∈ analz (IK s))
  }"

lemmas m3_inv3_sesK_comprI = m3_inv3_sesK_compr_def [THEN setc_def_to_intro, rule_format]
lemmas m3_inv3_sesK_comprE = m3_inv3_sesK_compr_def [THEN setc_def_to_elim, rule_format]
lemmas m3_inv3_sesK_comprD = m3_inv3_sesK_compr_def [THEN setc_def_to_dest, rule_format]

text ‹Additional lemma›
lemmas insert_commute_Key = insert_commute [where x="Key K" for K]

lemmas m3_inv3_sesK_compr_simps =
  m3_inv3_sesK_comprD
  m3_inv3_sesK_comprD [where KK="{Kab}" for Kab, simplified]
  m3_inv3_sesK_comprD [where KK="insert Kab KK" for Kab KK, simplified]
  insert_commute_Key    ― ‹to get the keys to the front›


text ‹Invariance proof.›

lemma PO_m3_inv3_sesK_compr_step4:
  "{m3_inv3_sesK_compr ∩ m3_inv2_ticket ∩ m3_inv1_lkeysec}
      m3_step4 Ra A B Kab Ts X
   {> m3_inv3_sesK_compr}"
proof -
  { fix K KK s
    assume H:
      "s ∈ m3_inv1_lkeysec" "s ∈ m3_inv3_sesK_compr" "s ∈ m3_inv2_ticket"
      "runs s Ra = Some (Init, [A, B], [])"
      "KK ⊆ range sesK"
      "Crypt (shrK A) ⦃Key Kab, Agent B, Number Ts, X⦄ ∈ analz (IK s)"
    have
      "(Key K ∈ analz (insert X (Key ` KK ∪ IK s))) =
          (K ∈ KK ∨ Key K ∈ analz (insert X (IK s)))"
    proof (cases "A ∈ bad")
      case True show ?thesis
      proof -
        note H
      moreover
        with ‹A ∈ bad› have "X ∈ analz (IK s)"
        by (auto dest!: Decrypt)
      moreover
        hence "X ∈ analz (Key ` KK ∪ IK s)"
        by (auto intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
      ultimately
        show ?thesis
        by (auto simp add: m3_inv3_sesK_compr_simps analz_insert_eq)
      qed
    next
      case False thus ?thesis using H
      by (fastforce simp add: m3_inv3_sesK_compr_simps dest!: m3_inv2_ticketD [OF analz_into_parts])
    qed
  }
  thus ?thesis
  by (auto simp add: PO_hoare_defs m3_defs intro!: m3_inv3_sesK_comprI dest!: analz_Inj_IK)
qed


text ‹All together now.›

lemmas PO_m3_inv3_sesK_compr_trans_lemmas =
  PO_m3_inv3_sesK_compr_step4

lemma PO_m3_inv3_sesK_compr_init [iff]:
  "init m3 ⊆ m3_inv3_sesK_compr"
by (auto simp add: m3_defs intro!: m3_inv3_sesK_comprI)

lemma PO_m3_inv3_sesK_compr_trans [iff]:
  "{m3_inv3_sesK_compr ∩ m3_inv2_ticket ∩ m3_inv1_lkeysec}
     trans m3
   {> m3_inv3_sesK_compr}"
by (auto simp add: m3_def m3_trans_def intro!: PO_m3_inv3_sesK_compr_trans_lemmas)
   (auto simp add: PO_hoare_defs m3_defs m3_inv3_sesK_compr_simps intro!: m3_inv3_sesK_comprI)

lemma PO_m3_inv3_sesK_compr [iff]: "reach m3 ⊆ m3_inv3_sesK_compr"
by (rule_tac J="m3_inv2_ticket ∩ m3_inv1_lkeysec" in inv_rule_incr) (auto)


(******************************************************************************)
subsection ‹Refinement›
(******************************************************************************)

subsubsection ‹Message abstraction and simulation relation›
(******************************************************************************)

text ‹Abstraction function on sets of messages.›

inductive_set
  abs_msg :: "msg set ⇒ chmsg set"
  for H :: "msg set"
where
  am_M1:
    "⦃Agent A, Agent B⦄ ∈ H
  ⟹ Insec A B (Msg []) ∈ abs_msg H"
| am_M2a:
    "Crypt (shrK C) ⦃Key K, Agent B, Number T, X⦄ ∈ H
  ⟹ Secure Sv C (Msg [aAgt B, aKey K, aNum T]) ∈ abs_msg H"
| am_M2b:
    "Crypt (shrK C) ⦃Key K, Agent A, Number T⦄ ∈ H
  ⟹ Secure Sv C (Msg [aKey K, aAgt A, aNum T]) ∈ abs_msg H"


text ‹R23: The simulation relation. This is a data refinement of
the insecure and secure channels of refinement 2.›

definition
  R23_msgs :: "(m2_state × m3_state) set" where
  "R23_msgs ≡ {(s, t). abs_msg (parts (IK t)) ⊆ chan s }"

definition
  R23_keys :: "(m2_state × m3_state) set" where
  "R23_keys ≡ {(s, t). ∀KK K. KK ⊆ range sesK ⟶
     Key K ∈ analz (Key`KK ∪ (IK t)) ⟶ aKey K ∈ extr (aKey`KK ∪ ik0) (chan s)
  }"

definition
  R23_pres :: "(m2_state × m3_state) set" where
  "R23_pres ≡ {(s, t). runs s = runs t ∧ clk s = clk t ∧ leak s = leak t}"

definition
  R23 :: "(m2_state × m3_state) set" where
  "R23 ≡ R23_msgs ∩ R23_keys ∩ R23_pres"

lemmas R23_defs =
  R23_def R23_msgs_def R23_keys_def R23_pres_def


text ‹The mediator function is the identity here.›

definition
  med32 :: "m3_obs ⇒ m2_obs" where
  "med32 ≡ id"


lemmas R23_msgsI = R23_msgs_def [THEN rel_def_to_intro, simplified, rule_format]
lemmas R23_msgsE [elim] = R23_msgs_def [THEN rel_def_to_elim, simplified, rule_format]

lemmas R23_keysI = R23_keys_def [THEN rel_def_to_intro, simplified, rule_format]
lemmas R23_keysE [elim] = R23_keys_def [THEN rel_def_to_elim, simplified, rule_format]

lemmas R23_presI = R23_pres_def [THEN rel_def_to_intro, simplified, rule_format]
lemmas R23_presE [elim] = R23_pres_def [THEN rel_def_to_elim, simplified, rule_format]

lemmas R23_intros = R23_msgsI R23_keysI R23_presI


text ‹Lemmas for various instantiations (for keys).›

lemmas R23_keys_dest = R23_keys_def [THEN rel_def_to_dest, simplified, rule_format, rotated 2]
lemmas R23_keys_dests =
  R23_keys_dest
  R23_keys_dest [where KK="{}", simplified]
  R23_keys_dest [where KK="{K'}" for K', simplified]
  R23_keys_dest [where KK="insert K' KK" for K' KK, simplified, OF _ _ conjI]


subsubsection ‹General lemmas›
(******************************************************************************)

text ‹General facts about @{term "abs_msg"}›

declare abs_msg.intros [intro!]
declare abs_msg.cases [elim!]

lemma abs_msg_empty: "abs_msg {} = {}"
by (auto)

lemma abs_msg_Un [simp]:
  "abs_msg (G ∪ H) = abs_msg G ∪ abs_msg H"
by (auto)

lemma abs_msg_mono [elim]:
  "⟦ m ∈ abs_msg G; G ⊆ H ⟧ ⟹ m ∈ abs_msg H"
by (auto)

lemma abs_msg_insert_mono [intro]:
  "⟦ m ∈ abs_msg H ⟧ ⟹ m ∈ abs_msg (insert m' H)"
by (auto)


text ‹Facts about @{term "abs_msg"} concerning abstraction of fakeable
messages. This is crucial for proving the refinement of the intruder event.›

lemma abs_msg_DY_subset_fakeable:
  "⟦ (s, t) ∈ R23_msgs; (s, t) ∈ R23_keys; (s, t) ∈ R23_non; t ∈ m3_inv1_lkeysec ⟧
  ⟹ abs_msg (synth (analz (IK t))) ⊆ fake ik0 (dom (runs s)) (chan s)"
apply (auto)
― ‹4 subgoals, deal with replays first›
apply (blast)
defer 1 apply (blast)
― ‹remaining 2 subgoals are real fakes›
apply (rule fake_StatCh, auto dest: R23_keys_dests)+
done


subsubsection ‹Refinement proof›
(******************************************************************************)

text ‹Pair decomposition. These were set to \texttt{elim!}, which is too
agressive here.›

declare MPair_analz [rule del, elim]
declare MPair_parts [rule del, elim]


text ‹Protocol events.›

lemma PO_m3_step1_refines_m2_step1:
  "{R23}
     (m2_step1 Ra A B), (m3_step1 Ra A B)
   {> R23}"
by (auto simp add: PO_rhoare_defs R23_def m3_defs intro!: R23_intros)
   (auto)

lemma PO_m3_step2_refines_m2_step2:
  "{R23}
     (m2_step2 Rb A B), (m3_step2 Rb A B)
   {> R23}"
by (auto simp add: PO_rhoare_defs R23_def m3_defs intro!: R23_intros)
   (auto)

lemma PO_m3_step3_refines_m2_step3:
  "{R23 ∩ (m2_inv3a_sesK_compr) × (m3_inv3_sesK_compr ∩ m3_inv1_lkeysec)}
     (m2_step3 Rs A B Kab Ts), (m3_step3 Rs A B Kab Ts)
   {> R23}"
proof -
  { fix s t
    assume H:
      "(s, t) ∈ R23_msgs" "(s, t) ∈ R23_keys" "(s, t) ∈ R23_pres"
      "s ∈ m2_inv3a_sesK_compr" "t ∈ m3_inv3_sesK_compr" "t ∈ m3_inv1_lkeysec"
      "Kab = sesK (Rs$sk)" "Rs ∉ dom (runs t)"
      "⦃Agent A, Agent B⦄ ∈ parts (IK t)"
    let ?s'=
      "s⦇ runs := (runs s)(Rs ↦ (Serv, [A, B], [aNum (clk t)])),
          chan := insert (Secure Sv A (Msg [aAgt B, aKey Kab, aNum (clk t)]))
                 (insert (Secure Sv B (Msg [aKey Kab, aAgt A, aNum (clk t)])) (chan s)) ⦈"
    let ?t'=
      "t⦇ runs := (runs t)(Rs ↦ (Serv, [A, B], [aNum (clk t)])),
          IK := insert
                  (Crypt (shrK A)
                     ⦃ Key Kab, Agent B, Number (clk t),
                       Crypt (shrK B) ⦃ Key Kab, Agent A, Number (clk t) ⦄⦄)
                  (IK t) ⦈"
    have "(?s', ?t') ∈ R23_msgs" using H
    by (-) (rule R23_intros, auto)
  moreover
    have "(?s', ?t') ∈ R23_keys" using H
    by (-) (rule R23_intros,
            auto simp add: m2_inv3a_sesK_compr_simps m3_inv3_sesK_compr_simps dest: R23_keys_dests)
  moreover
    have "(?s', ?t') ∈ R23_pres" using H
    by (-) (rule R23_intros, auto)
  moreover
    note calculation
  }
  thus ?thesis by (auto simp add: PO_rhoare_defs R23_def m3_defs)
qed

lemma PO_m3_step4_refines_m2_step4:
  "{R23 ∩
    UNIV × (m3_inv3_sesK_compr ∩ m3_inv2_ticket ∩ m3_inv1_lkeysec)}
     (m2_step4 Ra A B Kab Ts), (m3_step4 Ra A B Kab Ts X)
   {> R23}"
proof -
  { fix s t
    assume H:
      "(s, t) ∈ R23_msgs" "(s, t) ∈ R23_keys" "(s, t) ∈ R23_pres"
      "t ∈ m3_inv3_sesK_compr" "t ∈ m3_inv2_ticket"  "t ∈ m3_inv1_lkeysec"
      "runs t Ra = Some (Init, [A, B], [])"
      "Crypt (shrK A) ⦃Key Kab, Agent B, Number Ts, X⦄ ∈ analz (IK t)"
    let ?s' = "s⦇ runs := (runs s)(Ra ↦ (Init, [A, B], [aKey Kab, aNum Ts])) ⦈"
    and ?t' = "t⦇ runs := (runs t)(Ra ↦ (Init, [A, B], [aKey Kab, aNum Ts])),
                 IK := insert X  (IK t) ⦈"
    from H have
      "Secure Sv A (Msg [aAgt B, aKey Kab, aNum Ts]) ∈ chan s"
      by (auto)
  moreover
    have "X ∈ parts (IK t)" using H
      by (auto dest!: Body MPair_parts)
    hence "(?s', ?t') ∈ R23_msgs" using H
      by (auto intro!: R23_intros) (auto)
  moreover
    have "(?s', ?t') ∈ R23_keys"
    proof (cases)
      assume "A ∈ bad" show ?thesis
      proof -
        note H
      moreover
        hence "X ∈ analz (IK t)" using ‹A ∈ bad›
          by (-) (drule Decrypt, auto)
      ultimately
        show ?thesis
          by (-) (rule R23_intros, auto dest!: analz_cut intro: analz_monotonic)
      qed
    next
      assume "A ∉ bad" show ?thesis
      proof -
        note H
      moreover
        with ‹A ∉ bad› have
          "X = Crypt (shrK B) ⦃Key Kab, Agent A, Number Ts ⦄ ∧ Kab ∈ range sesK"
          by (auto dest!: m3_inv2_ticketD)
      moreover
        { assume H1: "Key (shrK B) ∈ analz (IK t)"
          have "aKey Kab ∈ extr ik0 (chan s)"
          proof -
            note calculation
          moreover
            hence "Secure Sv B (Msg [aKey Kab, aAgt A, aNum Ts]) ∈ chan s"
              by (-) (drule analz_into_parts, drule Body, elim MPair_parts, auto)
          ultimately
            show ?thesis using H1 by auto
          qed
        }
      ultimately show ?thesis
        by (-) (rule R23_intros, auto simp add: m3_inv3_sesK_compr_simps)
      qed
    qed
  moreover
    have "(?s', ?t') ∈ R23_pres" using H
      by (auto intro!: R23_intros)
  moreover
    note calculation
  }
  thus ?thesis
    by (auto simp add: PO_rhoare_defs R23_def m3_defs dest!: analz_Inj_IK)
qed

lemma PO_m3_step5_refines_m2_step5:
  "{R23}
     (m2_step5 Rb A B Kab Ts), (m3_step5 Rb A B Kab Ts)
   {> R23}"
by (auto simp add: PO_rhoare_defs R23_def m3_defs intro!: R23_intros)
   (auto)

lemma PO_m3_tick_refines_m2_tick:
  "{R23}
    (m2_tick T), (m3_tick T)
   {>R23}"
by (auto simp add: PO_rhoare_defs R23_def m3_defs intro!: R23_intros)
   (auto)


text ‹Intruder events.›

lemma PO_m3_leak_refines_m2_leak:
  "{R23}
    (m2_leak Rs), (m3_leak Rs)
   {>R23}"
by (auto simp add: PO_rhoare_defs R23_def m3_defs intro!: R23_intros)
   (auto dest: R23_keys_dests)

lemma PO_m3_DY_fake_refines_m2_fake:
  "{R23 ∩ UNIV × (m3_inv1_lkeysec)}
     m2_fake, m3_DY_fake
   {> R23}"
apply (auto simp add: PO_rhoare_defs R23_def m3_defs intro!: R23_intros del: abs_msg.cases)
apply (auto intro: abs_msg_DY_subset_fakeable [THEN subsetD] del: abs_msg.cases
            dest: R23_keys_dests)
done


text ‹All together now...›

lemmas PO_m3_trans_refines_m2_trans =
  PO_m3_step1_refines_m2_step1 PO_m3_step2_refines_m2_step2
  PO_m3_step3_refines_m2_step3 PO_m3_step4_refines_m2_step4
  PO_m3_step5_refines_m2_step5 PO_m3_tick_refines_m2_tick
  PO_m3_leak_refines_m2_leak PO_m3_DY_fake_refines_m2_fake


lemma PO_m3_refines_init_m2 [iff]:
  "init m3 ⊆ R23``(init m2)"
by (auto simp add: R23_def m3_defs ik0_def intro!: R23_intros)

lemma PO_m3_refines_trans_m2 [iff]:
  "{R23 ∩
    (m2_inv3a_sesK_compr) × (m3_inv3_sesK_compr ∩ m3_inv2_ticket ∩ m3_inv1_lkeysec)}
     (trans m2), (trans m3)
   {> R23}"
by (auto simp add: m3_def m3_trans_def m2_def m2_trans_def)
   (blast intro!: PO_m3_trans_refines_m2_trans)+

lemma PO_m3_observation_consistent [iff]:
  "obs_consistent R23 med32 m2 m3"
by (auto simp add: obs_consistent_def R23_def med32_def m3_defs)


text ‹Refinement result.›

lemma m3_refines_m2 [iff]:
  "refines
     (R23 ∩ (m2_inv3a_sesK_compr) × (m3_inv3_sesK_compr ∩ m3_inv2_ticket ∩ m3_inv1_lkeysec))
     med32 m2 m3"
by (rule Refinement_using_invariants) (auto)

lemma m3_implements_m2 [iff]:
  "implements med32 m2 m3"
by (rule refinement_soundness) (auto)


end