

# Randomised Social Choice

Manuel Eberl

February 6, 2026

## Abstract

This work contains a formalisation of basic Randomised Social Choice, including Stochastic Dominance and Social Decision Schemes (SDSs) along with some of their most important properties (Anonymity, Neutrality, *SD*-Efficiency, *SD*-Strategy-Proofness) and two particular SDSs – Random Dictatorship and Random Serial Dictatorship (with proofs of the properties that they satisfy). Many important properties of these concepts are also proven – such as the two equivalent characterisations of Stochastic Dominance and the fact that *SD*-efficiency of a lottery only depends on the support.

The entry also provides convenient commands to define Preference Profiles, prove their well-formedness, and automatically derive restrictions that sufficiently nice SDSs need to satisfy on the defined profiles. (cf. [1])

Currently, the formalisation focuses on weak preferences and Stochastic Dominance (*SD*), but it should be easy to extend it to other domains – such as strict preferences – or other lottery extensions – such as Bilinear Dominance or Pairwise Comparison.

## Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Order Relations as Binary Predicates</b>	<b>4</b>
1.1	Basic Operations on Relations . . . . .	4
1.2	Preorders . . . . .	4
1.3	Total preorders . . . . .	5
1.4	Orders . . . . .	6
1.5	Maximal elements . . . . .	6
1.6	Weak rankings . . . . .	8
1.7	Rankings . . . . .	16
<b>2</b>	<b>Preference Profiles</b>	<b>17</b>
2.1	Pareto dominance . . . . .	19
2.2	Preferred alternatives . . . . .	20
2.3	Favourite alternatives . . . . .	20
2.4	Anonymous profiles . . . . .	21

2.5	Preference profiles from lists . . . . .	22
2.6	Automatic evaluation of preference profiles . . . . .	23
<b>3</b>	<b>Auxiliary facts about PMFs</b>	<b>26</b>
3.1	Definition of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions . . . . .	27
<b>4</b>	<b>Stochastic Dominance</b>	<b>28</b>
4.1	Definition of Stochastic Dominance . . . . .	28
4.2	Stochastic Dominance for preference profiles . . . . .	30
4.3	SD efficient lotteries . . . . .	31
4.4	Equivalence proof . . . . .	32
4.5	Existence of SD-efficient lotteries . . . . .	34
<b>5</b>	<b>Social Decision Schemes</b>	<b>35</b>
5.1	Basic Social Choice definitions . . . . .	36
5.2	Social Decision Schemes . . . . .	36
5.3	Anonymity . . . . .	36
5.4	Neutrality . . . . .	37
5.5	Ex-post efficiency . . . . .	38
5.6	SD efficiency . . . . .	39
5.7	Weak strategyproofness . . . . .	39
5.8	Strong strategyproofness . . . . .	40
<b>6</b>	<b>Lowering Social Decision Schemes</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Random Dictatorship</b>	<b>46</b>
7.1	Anonymity . . . . .	47
7.2	Neutrality . . . . .	47
7.3	Strong strategyproofness . . . . .	48
<b>8</b>	<b>Random Serial Dictatorship</b>	<b>48</b>
8.1	Auxiliary facts about RSD . . . . .	50
8.1.1	Pareto-equivalence classes . . . . .	50
8.1.2	Facts about RSD winners . . . . .	51
8.2	Proofs of properties . . . . .	53
8.2.1	Well-definedness . . . . .	53
8.2.2	RD extension . . . . .	53
8.2.3	Anonymity . . . . .	53
8.2.4	Neutrality . . . . .	54
8.2.5	Ex-post efficiency . . . . .	54
8.2.6	Strong strategy-proofness . . . . .	54
<b>9</b>	<b>Automatic definition of Preference Profiles</b>	<b>55</b>
9.1	Automatic definition of preference profiles from tables . . . . .	55



# 1 Order Relations as Binary Predicates

```
theory Order-Predicates
imports
  Main
  HOL-Library.Disjoint-Sets
  HOL-Combinatorics.Permutations
  List-Index.List-Index
begin
```

## 1.1 Basic Operations on Relations

The type of binary relations

```
type-synonym 'a relation = 'a  $\Rightarrow$  'a  $\Rightarrow$  bool
```

```
definition map-relation :: ('a  $\Rightarrow$  'b)  $\Rightarrow$  'b relation  $\Rightarrow$  'a relation where
  map-relation f R = ( $\lambda$ x y. R (f x) (f y))
```

```
definition restrict-relation :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a relation  $\Rightarrow$  'a relation where
  restrict-relation A R = ( $\lambda$ x y. x  $\in$  A  $\wedge$  y  $\in$  A  $\wedge$  R x y)
```

```
lemma restrict-relation-restrict-relation [simp]:
  restrict-relation A (restrict-relation B R) = restrict-relation (A  $\cap$  B) R
  <proof>
```

```
lemma restrict-relation-empty [simp]: restrict-relation {} R = ( $\lambda$ - . False)
  <proof>
```

```
lemma restrict-relation-UNIV [simp]: restrict-relation UNIV R = R
  <proof>
```

## 1.2 Preorders

Preorders are reflexive and transitive binary relations.

```
locale preorder-on =
  fixes carrier :: 'a set
  fixes le :: 'a relation
  assumes not-outside: le x y  $\implies$  x  $\in$  carrier le x y  $\implies$  y  $\in$  carrier
  assumes refl: x  $\in$  carrier  $\implies$  le x x
  assumes trans: le x y  $\implies$  le y z  $\implies$  le x z
begin
```

```
lemma carrier-eq: carrier = {x. le x x}
  <proof>
```

```
lemma preorder-on-map:
  preorder-on (f -' carrier) (map-relation f le)
  <proof>
```

**lemma** *preorder-on-restrict*:  
*preorder-on* (*carrier*  $\cap$  *A*) (*restrict-relation* *A* *le*)  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *preorder-on-restrict-subset*:  
 $A \subseteq \text{carrier} \implies \text{preorder-on } A$  (*restrict-relation* *A* *le*)  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *restrict-relation-carrier* [*simp*]:  
*restrict-relation* *carrier* *le* = *le*  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**end**

### 1.3 Total preorders

Total preorders are preorders where any two elements are comparable.

**locale** *total-preorder-on* = *preorder-on* +  
**assumes** *total*:  $x \in \text{carrier} \implies y \in \text{carrier} \implies \text{le } x \ y \vee \text{le } y \ x$   
**begin**

**lemma** *total'*:  $\neg \text{le } x \ y \implies x \in \text{carrier} \implies y \in \text{carrier} \implies \text{le } y \ x$   
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *total-preorder-on-map*:  
*total-preorder-on* (*f* -' *carrier*) (*map-relation* *f* *le*)  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *total-preorder-on-restrict*:  
*total-preorder-on* (*carrier*  $\cap$  *A*) (*restrict-relation* *A* *le*)  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *total-preorder-on-restrict-subset*:  
 $A \subseteq \text{carrier} \implies \text{total-preorder-on } A$  (*restrict-relation* *A* *le*)  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**end**

Some fancy notation for order relations

**abbreviation** (*input*) *weakly-preferred* :: '*a*  $\Rightarrow$  '*a* *relation*  $\Rightarrow$  '*a*  $\Rightarrow$  *bool*  
 ( $\langle \cdot \preceq[\cdot] \rightarrow [51,10,51] \ 60 \rangle$  **where**  
 $a \preceq[R] b \equiv R \ a \ b$

**definition** *strongly-preferred* ( $\langle \cdot \prec[\cdot] \rightarrow [51,10,51] \ 60 \rangle$  **where**  
 $a \prec[R] b \equiv (a \preceq[R] b) \wedge \neg(b \preceq[R] a)$

**definition** *indifferent* ( $\langle \cdot \sim[\cdot] \rightarrow [51,10,51] \ 60 \rangle$  **where**  
 $a \sim[R] b \equiv (a \preceq[R] b) \wedge (b \preceq[R] a)$

**abbreviation** (*input*) *weakly-not-preferred* ( $\prec \succeq[-] \rightarrow [51,10,51] 60$ ) **where**

$a \succeq[R] b \equiv b \preceq[R] a$

**term**  $a \succeq[R] b \longleftrightarrow b \preceq[R] a$

**abbreviation** (*input*) *strongly-not-preferred* ( $\prec \succ[-] \rightarrow [51,10,51] 60$ ) **where**

$a \succ[R] b \equiv b \prec[R] a$

**context** *preorder-on*

**begin**

**lemma** *strict-trans*:  $a \prec[le] b \implies b \prec[le] c \implies a \prec[le] c$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-strict-trans*:  $a \preceq[le] b \implies b \prec[le] c \implies a \prec[le] c$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *strict-weak-trans*:  $a \prec[le] b \implies b \preceq[le] c \implies a \prec[le] c$

*<proof>*

**end**

**lemma** (**in** *total-preorder-on*) *not-weakly-preferred-iff*:

$a \in \text{carrier} \implies b \in \text{carrier} \implies \neg a \preceq[le] b \longleftrightarrow b \prec[le] a$

*<proof>*

**lemma** (**in** *total-preorder-on*) *not-strongly-preferred-iff*:

$a \in \text{carrier} \implies b \in \text{carrier} \implies \neg a \prec[le] b \longleftrightarrow b \preceq[le] a$

*<proof>*

## 1.4 Orders

**locale** *order-on* = *preorder-on* +

**assumes** *antisymmetric*:  $le\ x\ y \implies le\ y\ x \implies x = y$

**locale** *linorder-on* = *order-on carrier le* + *total-preorder-on carrier le* **for** *carrier le*

## 1.5 Maximal elements

Maximal elements are elements in a preorder for which there exists no strictly greater element.

**definition** *Max-wrt-among* :: '*a relation*  $\implies$  '*a set*  $\implies$  '*a set* **where**

$Max\text{-wrt-among}\ R\ A = \{x \in A. R\ x\ x \wedge (\forall y \in A. R\ x\ y \longrightarrow R\ y\ x)\}$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-cong*:

**assumes** *restrict-relation*  $A\ R = \text{restrict-relation}\ A\ R'$

**shows**  $Max\text{-wrt-among}\ R\ A = Max\text{-wrt-among}\ R'\ A$

*<proof>*

**definition** *Max-wrt* :: 'a relation  $\Rightarrow$  'a set **where**

*Max-wrt*  $R = \text{Max-wrt-among } R \text{ UNIV}$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-altdef*:  $\text{Max-wrt } R = \{x. R \ x \ x \wedge (\forall y. R \ x \ y \longrightarrow R \ y \ x)\}$   
(proof)

**context** *preorder-on*  
**begin**

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-preorder*:

*Max-wrt-among*  $le \ A = \{x \in \text{carrier} \cap A. \forall y \in \text{carrier} \cap A. le \ x \ y \longrightarrow le \ y \ x\}$   
(proof)

**lemma** *Max-wrt-preorder*:

*Max-wrt*  $le = \{x \in \text{carrier}. \forall y \in \text{carrier}. le \ x \ y \longrightarrow le \ y \ x\}$   
(proof)

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-subset*:

*Max-wrt-among*  $le \ A \subseteq \text{carrier} \ \text{Max-wrt-among } le \ A \subseteq A$   
(proof)

**lemma** *Max-wrt-subset*:

*Max-wrt*  $le \subseteq \text{carrier}$   
(proof)

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-nonempty*:

**assumes**  $B \cap \text{carrier} \neq \{\}$  *finite*  $(B \cap \text{carrier})$

**shows** *Max-wrt-among*  $le \ B \neq \{\}$

(proof)

**lemma** *Max-wrt-nonempty*:

$\text{carrier} \neq \{\} \Longrightarrow \text{finite } \text{carrier} \Longrightarrow \text{Max-wrt } le \neq \{\}$   
(proof)

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-map-relation-vimage*:

$f \text{ -' } \text{Max-wrt-among } le \ A \subseteq \text{Max-wrt-among } (\text{map-relation } f \ le) \ (f \text{ -' } A)$   
(proof)

**lemma** *Max-wrt-map-relation-vimage*:

$f \text{ -' } \text{Max-wrt } le \subseteq \text{Max-wrt } (\text{map-relation } f \ le)$   
(proof)

**lemma** *image-subset-vimage-the-inv-into*:

**assumes** *inj-on*  $f \ A \ B \subseteq A$

**shows**  $f \text{ -' } B \subseteq \text{the-inv-into } A \ f \text{ -' } B$

(proof)

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-map-relation-bij-subset*:

**assumes**  $\text{bij } (f :: 'a \Rightarrow 'b)$   
**shows**  $f \text{ ' } \text{Max-wrt-among } le \ A \subseteq$   
 $\text{Max-wrt-among } (\text{map-relation } (\text{inv } f) \ le) \ (f \text{ ' } A)$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-map-relation-bij*:

**assumes**  $\text{bij } f$   
**shows**  $f \text{ ' } \text{Max-wrt-among } le \ A = \text{Max-wrt-among } (\text{map-relation } (\text{inv } f) \ le) \ (f \text{ ' } A)$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-map-relation-bij*:

$\text{bij } f \Longrightarrow f \text{ ' } \text{Max-wrt } le = \text{Max-wrt } (\text{map-relation } (\text{inv } f) \ le)$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-mono*:

$le \ x \ y \Longrightarrow x \in \text{Max-wrt-among } le \ A \Longrightarrow y \in A \Longrightarrow y \in \text{Max-wrt-among } le \ A$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-mono*:

$le \ x \ y \Longrightarrow x \in \text{Max-wrt } le \Longrightarrow y \in \text{Max-wrt } le$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**end**

**context** *total-preorder-on*

**begin**

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-total-preorder*:

$\text{Max-wrt-among } le \ A = \{x \in \text{carrier} \cap A. \forall y \in \text{carrier} \cap A. le \ y \ x\}$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-total-preorder*:

$\text{Max-wrt } le = \{x \in \text{carrier}. \forall y \in \text{carrier}. le \ y \ x\}$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *decompose-Max*:

**assumes**  $A: A \subseteq \text{carrier}$

**defines**  $M \equiv \text{Max-wrt-among } le \ A$

**shows**  $\text{restrict-relation } A \ le = (\lambda x \ y. x \in A \wedge y \in M \vee (y \notin M \wedge \text{restrict-relation } (A - M) \ le \ x \ y))$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**end**

## 1.6 Weak rankings

**inductive** *of-weak-ranking* :: *'alt set list*  $\Rightarrow$  *'alt relation* **where**

$i \leq j \implies i < \text{length } xs \implies j < \text{length } xs \implies x \in xs ! i \implies y \in xs ! j \implies x \succeq[\text{of-weak-ranking } xs] y$

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-Nil* [simp]: *of-weak-ranking* [] = ( $\lambda$ - . *False*)  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-Nil'* [code]: *of-weak-ranking* [] *x y* = *False*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-Cons* [code]:  
 $x \succeq[\text{of-weak-ranking } (z\#zs)] y \longleftrightarrow x \in z \wedge y \in \bigcup(\text{set } (z\#zs)) \vee x \succeq[\text{of-weak-ranking } zs] y$   
 (is ?lhs  $\longleftrightarrow$  ?rhs)  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-indifference*:  
**assumes**  $A \in \text{set } xs \ x \in A \ y \in A$   
**shows**  $x \preceq[\text{of-weak-ranking } xs] y$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-map*:  
*map-relation* *f* (*of-weak-ranking* *xs*) = *of-weak-ranking* (*map* ((- $\cdot$ ) *f*) *xs*)  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-permute'*:  
**assumes** *f* permutes ( $\bigcup(\text{set } xs)$ )  
**shows** *map-relation* *f* (*of-weak-ranking* *xs*) = *of-weak-ranking* (*map* (( $\cdot$ ) (*inv* *f*)) *xs*)  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-permute*:  
**assumes** *f* permutes ( $\bigcup(\text{set } xs)$ )  
**shows** *of-weak-ranking* (*map* (( $\cdot$ ) *f*) *xs*) = *map-relation* (*inv* *f*) (*of-weak-ranking* *xs*)  
 ⟨proof⟩

**definition** *is-weak-ranking where*  
 $\text{is-weak-ranking } xs \longleftrightarrow (\{\} \notin \text{set } xs) \wedge$   
 $(\forall i j. i < \text{length } xs \wedge j < \text{length } xs \wedge i \neq j \longrightarrow xs ! i \cap xs ! j = \{\})$

**definition** *is-finite-weak-ranking where*  
 $\text{is-finite-weak-ranking } xs \longleftrightarrow \text{is-weak-ranking } xs \wedge (\forall x \in \text{set } xs. \text{finite } x)$

**definition** *weak-ranking* :: '*alt relation*  $\Rightarrow$  '*alt set list where*  
 $\text{weak-ranking } R = (\text{SOME } xs. \text{is-weak-ranking } xs \wedge R = \text{of-weak-ranking } xs)$

**lemma** *is-weak-rankingI* [intro?]:  
**assumes**  $\{\} \notin \text{set } xs \wedge i j. i < \text{length } xs \implies j < \text{length } xs \implies i \neq j \implies xs ! i$

$\cap xs ! j = \{\}$   
**shows** *is-weak-ranking xs*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-nonempty*: *is-weak-ranking xs*  $\implies \{\} \notin \text{set } xs$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-weak-rankingD*:  
**assumes** *is-weak-ranking xs*  $i < \text{length } xs$   $j < \text{length } xs$   $i \neq j$   
**shows**  $xs ! i \cap xs ! j = \{\}$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-iff*:  
*is-weak-ranking xs*  $\longleftrightarrow \text{distinct } xs \wedge \text{disjoint } (\text{set } xs) \wedge \{\} \notin \text{set } xs$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-rev* [simp]: *is-weak-ranking (rev xs)*  $\longleftrightarrow$  *is-weak-ranking xs*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-map-inj*:  
**assumes** *is-weak-ranking xs* *inj-on f*  $(\bigcup (\text{set } xs))$   
**shows** *is-weak-ranking (map (( $\cdot$ ) f) xs)*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-rev* [simp]:  
*of-weak-ranking (rev xs) (x::'a) y*  $\longleftrightarrow$  *of-weak-ranking xs y x*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-Nil* [simp, code]: *is-weak-ranking []*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-finite-weak-ranking-Nil* [simp, code]: *is-finite-weak-ranking []*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-Cons-empty* [simp]:  
 $\neg \text{is-weak-ranking } (\{\} \# xs)$  ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-finite-weak-ranking-Cons-empty* [simp]:  
 $\neg \text{is-finite-weak-ranking } (\{\} \# xs)$  ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-singleton* [simp]:  
*is-weak-ranking [x]*  $\longleftrightarrow x \neq \{\}$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-finite-weak-ranking-singleton* [simp]:  
*is-finite-weak-ranking [x]*  $\longleftrightarrow x \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } x$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-append*:

*is-weak-ranking* ( $xs @ ys$ )  $\longleftrightarrow$   
*is-weak-ranking*  $xs \wedge$  *is-weak-ranking*  $ys \wedge$   
 $(set\ xs \cap set\ ys = \{\}) \wedge \bigcup (set\ xs) \cap \bigcup (set\ ys) = \{\}$   
(*proof*)

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-Cons*:

*is-weak-ranking* ( $x \# xs$ )  $\longleftrightarrow$   
 $x \neq \{\} \wedge$  *is-weak-ranking*  $xs \wedge x \cap \bigcup (set\ xs) = \{\}$   
(*proof*)

**lemma** *is-finite-weak-ranking-Cons* [code]:

*is-finite-weak-ranking* ( $x \# xs$ )  $\longleftrightarrow$   
 $x \neq \{\} \wedge$  *finite*  $x \wedge$  *is-finite-weak-ranking*  $xs \wedge x \cap \bigcup (set\ xs) = \{\}$   
(*proof*)

**primrec** *is-weak-ranking-aux* **where**

*is-weak-ranking-aux*  $A [] \longleftrightarrow$  *True*  
| *is-weak-ranking-aux*  $A (x\#\!xs) \longleftrightarrow x \neq \{\} \wedge$   
 $A \cap x = \{\} \wedge$  *is-weak-ranking-aux* ( $A \cup x$ )  $xs$

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-aux*:

*is-weak-ranking-aux*  $A\ xs \longleftrightarrow A \cap \bigcup (set\ xs) = \{\} \wedge$  *is-weak-ranking*  $xs$   
(*proof*)

**lemma** *is-weak-ranking-code* [code]:

*is-weak-ranking*  $xs \longleftrightarrow$  *is-weak-ranking-aux*  $\{\} xs$   
(*proof*)

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-altdef*:

**assumes** *is-weak-ranking*  $xs\ x \in \bigcup (set\ xs)\ y \in \bigcup (set\ xs)$   
**shows** *of-weak-ranking*  $xs\ x\ y \longleftrightarrow$   
*find-index* ( $(\in) x$ )  $xs \geq$  *find-index* ( $(\in) y$ )  $xs$

(*proof*)

**lemma** *total-preorder-of-weak-ranking*:

**assumes**  $\bigcup (set\ xs) = A$   
**assumes** *is-weak-ranking*  $xs$   
**shows** *total-preorder-on*  $A$  (*of-weak-ranking*  $xs$ )  
(*proof*)

**lemma** *restrict-relation-of-weak-ranking-Cons*:

**assumes** *is-weak-ranking* ( $A \# As$ )  
**shows** *restrict-relation* ( $\bigcup (set\ As)$ ) (*of-weak-ranking* ( $A \# As$ )) = *of-weak-ranking*  $As$   
(*proof*)

**lemmas** *of-weak-ranking-wf* =  
*total-preorder-of-weak-ranking is-weak-ranking-code insert-commute*

**lemma** *total-preorder-on*  $\{1,2,3,4::\text{nat}\}$  (*of-weak-ranking*  $[\{1,3\},\{2\},\{4\}]$ )  
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

**context**  
**fixes**  $x :: \text{'alt set}$  **and**  $xs :: \text{'alt set list}$   
**assumes**  $wf: \text{is-weak-ranking } (x\#xs)$   
**begin**

**interpretation**  $R: \text{total-preorder-on } \bigcup(\text{set } (x\#xs))$  *of-weak-ranking*  $(x\#xs)$   
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-imp-in-set*:  
**assumes** *of-weak-ranking*  $xs$   $a$   $b$   
**shows**  $a \in \bigcup(\text{set } xs)$   $b \in \bigcup(\text{set } xs)$   
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-Cons'*:  
**assumes**  $a \in \bigcup(\text{set } (x\#xs))$   $b \in \bigcup(\text{set } (x\#xs))$   
**shows** *of-weak-ranking*  $(x\#xs)$   $a$   $b \longleftrightarrow b \in x \vee (a \notin x \wedge \text{of-weak-ranking } xs$   $a$   $b)$   
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-of-weak-ranking-Cons1*:  
**assumes**  $x \cap A = \{\}$   
**shows** *Max-wrt-among* (*of-weak-ranking*  $(x\#xs)$ )  $A = \text{Max-wrt-among} (*of-weak-ranking*  $xs$ )  $A$   
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-of-weak-ranking-Cons2*:  
**assumes**  $x \cap A \neq \{\}$   
**shows** *Max-wrt-among* (*of-weak-ranking*  $(x\#xs)$ )  $A = x \cap A$   
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-among-of-weak-ranking-Cons*:  
*Max-wrt-among* (*of-weak-ranking*  $(x\#xs)$ )  $A =$   
*(if*  $x \cap A = \{\}$  *then* *Max-wrt-among* (*of-weak-ranking*  $xs$ )  $A$  *else*  $x \cap A$ )  
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

**lemma** *Max-wrt-of-weak-ranking-Cons*:

*Max-wrt (of-weak-ranking (x#xs)) = x*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**end**

**lemma** *Max-wrt-of-weak-ranking:*

**assumes** *is-weak-ranking xs*

**shows** *Max-wrt (of-weak-ranking xs) = (if xs = [] then {} else hd xs)*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**locale** *finite-total-preorder-on = total-preorder-on +*

**assumes** *finite-carrier [intro]: finite carrier*

**begin**

**lemma** *finite-total-preorder-on-map:*

**assumes** *finite (f -' carrier)*

**shows** *finite-total-preorder-on (f -' carrier) (map-relation f le)*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**function** *weak-ranking-aux :: 'a set ⇒ 'a set list where*

*weak-ranking-aux {} = []*

*| A ≠ {} ⇒ A ⊆ carrier ⇒ weak-ranking-aux A =*

*Max-wrt-among le A # weak-ranking-aux (A - Max-wrt-among le A)*

*| ¬(A ⊆ carrier) ⇒ weak-ranking-aux A = undefined*

⟨proof⟩

**termination** ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *weak-ranking-aux-Union:*

*A ⊆ carrier ⇒ ⋃(set (weak-ranking-aux A)) = A*

⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *weak-ranking-aux-wf:*

*A ⊆ carrier ⇒ is-weak-ranking (weak-ranking-aux A)*

⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-weak-ranking-aux':*

**assumes** *A ⊆ carrier x ∈ A y ∈ A*

**shows** *of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking-aux A) x y ⟷ restrict-relation A le x y*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-weak-ranking-aux:*

*of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking-aux carrier) = le*

⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *weak-ranking-aux-unique':*

**assumes** *⋃(set As) ⊆ carrier is-weak-ranking As*

*of-weak-ranking As = restrict-relation (⋃(set As)) le*

**shows** *As = weak-ranking-aux (⋃(set As))*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-aux-unique:*

**assumes** *is-weak-ranking As of-weak-ranking As = le*

**shows** *As = weak-ranking-aux carrier*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-total-preorder:*

*is-weak-ranking (weak-ranking le) of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking le) = le*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-altdef:*

*weak-ranking le = weak-ranking-aux carrier*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-Union:*  $\bigcup (\text{set } (\text{weak-ranking } le)) = \text{carrier}$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-unique:*

**assumes** *is-weak-ranking As of-weak-ranking As = le*

**shows** *As = weak-ranking le*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-permute:*

**assumes** *f permutes carrier*

**shows** *weak-ranking (map-relation (inv f) le) = map (( $\cdot$ ) f) (weak-ranking le)*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-index-unique:*

**assumes** *is-weak-ranking xs i < length xs j < length xs x  $\in$  xs ! i x  $\in$  xs ! j*

**shows** *i = j*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-index-unique':*

**assumes** *is-weak-ranking xs i < length xs x  $\in$  xs ! i*

**shows** *i = find-index (( $\in$ ) x) xs*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-eqclass1:*

**assumes** *A  $\in$  set (weak-ranking le) x  $\in$  A y  $\in$  A*

**shows** *le x y*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-eqclass2:*

**assumes** *A: A  $\in$  set (weak-ranking le) x  $\in$  A and le: le x y le y x*

**shows** *y  $\in$  A*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *hd-weak-ranking:*

**assumes**  $x \in \text{hd } (\text{weak-ranking } le) \ y \in \text{carrier}$   
**shows**  $le \ y \ x$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *last-weak-ranking*:  
**assumes**  $x \in \text{last } (\text{weak-ranking } le) \ y \in \text{carrier}$   
**shows**  $le \ x \ y$   
 ⟨proof⟩

The index in weak ranking of a given alternative. An element with index 0 is first-ranked; larger indices correspond to less-preferred alternatives.

**definition** *weak-ranking-index* :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  nat **where**  
 $\text{weak-ranking-index } x = \text{find-index } (\lambda A. x \in A) (\text{weak-ranking } le)$

**lemma** *nth-weak-ranking-index*:  
**assumes**  $x \in \text{carrier}$   
**shows**  $\text{weak-ranking-index } x < \text{length } (\text{weak-ranking } le)$   
 $x \in \text{weak-ranking } le \ ! \ \text{weak-ranking-index } x$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *ranking-index-eqI*:  
 $i < \text{length } (\text{weak-ranking } le) \ \Longrightarrow \ x \in \text{weak-ranking } le \ ! \ i \ \Longrightarrow \ \text{weak-ranking-index } x = i$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *ranking-index-le-iff* [simp]:  
**assumes**  $x \in \text{carrier} \ y \in \text{carrier}$   
**shows**  $\text{weak-ranking-index } x \geq \text{weak-ranking-index } y \ \longleftrightarrow \ le \ x \ y$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**end**

**lemma** *weak-ranking-False* [simp]:  $\text{weak-ranking } (\lambda - . \text{False}) = []$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemmas** *of-weak-ranking-weak-ranking* =  
 $\text{finite-total-preorder-on.weak-ranking-total-preorder}(2)$

**lemma** *finite-total-preorder-on-iff*:  
 $\text{finite-total-preorder-on } A \ R \ \longleftrightarrow \ \text{total-preorder-on } A \ R \ \wedge \ \text{finite } A$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *finite-total-preorder-of-weak-ranking*:  
**assumes**  $\bigcup (\text{set } xs) = A \ \text{is-finite-weak-ranking } xs$   
**shows**  $\text{finite-total-preorder-on } A \ (\text{of-weak-ranking } xs)$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *weak-ranking-of-weak-ranking*:  
**assumes**  $\text{is-finite-weak-ranking } xs$

**shows** *weak-ranking (of-weak-ranking xs) = xs*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-eqD*:  
**assumes** *finite-total-preorder-on alts R1*  
**assumes** *finite-total-preorder-on alts R2*  
**assumes** *weak-ranking R1 = weak-ranking R2*  
**shows** *R1 = R2*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-eq-iff*:  
**assumes** *finite-total-preorder-on alts R1*  
**assumes** *finite-total-preorder-on alts R2*  
**shows** *weak-ranking R1 = weak-ranking R2  $\longleftrightarrow$  R1 = R2*  
*<proof>*

**definition** *preferred-alts* :: 'alt relation  $\Rightarrow$  'alt  $\Rightarrow$  'alt set **where**  
*preferred-alts R x = {y. y  $\succeq$ [R] x}*

**lemma** (**in preorder-on**) *preferred-alts-refl [simp]: x  $\in$  carrier  $\Longrightarrow$  x  $\in$  preferred-alts le x*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** (**in preorder-on**) *preferred-alts-altdef*:  
*preferred-alts le x = {y  $\in$  carrier. y  $\succeq$ [le] x}*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** (**in preorder-on**) *preferred-alts-subset: preferred-alts le x  $\subseteq$  carrier*  
*<proof>*

## 1.7 Rankings

**definition** *ranking* :: 'a relation  $\Rightarrow$  'a list **where**  
*ranking R = map the-elem (weak-ranking R)*

**locale** *finite-linorder-on = linorder-on +*  
**assumes** *finite-carrier [intro]: finite carrier*  
**begin**

**sublocale** *finite-total-preorder-on carrier le*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *singleton-weak-ranking*:  
**assumes** *A  $\in$  set (weak-ranking le)*  
**shows** *is-singleton A*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *weak-ranking-ranking*: *weak-ranking le = map ( $\lambda x. \{x\}$ ) (ranking le)*  
 *<proof>*

**end**

**end**

## 2 Preference Profiles

**theory** *Preference-Profiles*

**imports**

*Main*

*Order-Predicates*

*HOL-Library.Multiset*

*HOL-Library.Disjoint-Sets*

**begin**

The type of preference profiles

**type-synonym** (*'agent, 'alt*) *pref-profile = 'agent  $\Rightarrow$  'alt relation*

**locale** *preorder-family =*

**fixes** *dom :: 'a set and carrier :: 'b set and R :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  'b relation*

**assumes** *nonempty-dom: dom  $\neq$  {}*

**assumes** *in-dom [simp]: i  $\in$  dom  $\implies$  preorder-on carrier (R i)*

**assumes** *not-in-dom [simp]: i  $\notin$  dom  $\implies$   $\neg$ R i x y*

**begin**

**lemma** *not-in-dom'*: *i  $\notin$  dom  $\implies$  R i = ( $\lambda$ -. False)*

*<proof>*

**end**

**locale** *pref-profile-wf =*

**fixes** *agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and R :: ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile*

**assumes** *nonempty-agents [simp]: agents  $\neq$  {} and nonempty-alts [simp]: alts  $\neq$  {}*

**assumes** *prefs-wf [simp]: i  $\in$  agents  $\implies$  finite-total-preorder-on alts (R i)*

**assumes** *prefs-undefined [simp]: i  $\notin$  agents  $\implies$   $\neg$ R i x y*

**begin**

**lemma** *finite-alts [simp]: finite alts*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *prefs-wf' [simp]:*

*i  $\in$  agents  $\implies$  total-preorder-on alts (R i) i  $\in$  agents  $\implies$  preorder-on alts (R i)*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *not-outside:*

**assumes**  $x \preceq[R\ i]\ y$   
**shows**  $i \in \text{agents } x \in \text{alts } y \in \text{alts}$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**sublocale** *preorder-family agents alts R*  
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemmas** *prefs-undefined' = not-in-dom'*

**lemma** *wf-update:*  
**assumes**  $i \in \text{agents total-preorder-on alts } Ri'$   
**shows** *pref-profile-wf agents alts (R(i := Ri'))*  
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *wf-permute-agents:*  
**assumes**  $\sigma$  *permutes agents*  
**shows** *pref-profile-wf agents alts (R  $\circ$   $\sigma$ )*  
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** (**in**  $-$ ) *pref-profile-eqI:*  
**assumes** *pref-profile-wf agents alts R1 pref-profile-wf agents alts R2*  
**assumes**  $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{agents} \implies R1\ x = R2\ x$   
**shows**  $R1 = R2$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**end**

Permutes a preference profile w.r.t. alternatives in the way described in the paper. This is needed for the definition of neutrality.

**definition** *permute-profile where*  
 $\text{permute-profile } \sigma\ R = (\lambda i\ x\ y. R\ i\ (\text{inv } \sigma\ x)\ (\text{inv } \sigma\ y))$

**lemma** *permute-profile-map-relation:*  
 $\text{permute-profile } \sigma\ R = (\lambda i. \text{map-relation } (\text{inv } \sigma)\ (R\ i))$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *permute-profile-compose [simp]:*  
 $\text{permute-profile } \sigma\ (R \circ \pi) = \text{permute-profile } \sigma\ R \circ \pi$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *permute-profile-id [simp]: permute-profile id R = R*  
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *permute-profile-o:*  
**assumes**  $\text{bij } f\ \text{bij } g$   
**shows**  $\text{permute-profile } f\ (\text{permute-profile } g\ R) = \text{permute-profile } (f \circ g)\ R$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** (**in** *pref-profile-wf*) *wf-permute-alts:*

**assumes**  $\sigma$  permutes alts  
**shows** *pref-profile-wf agents alts (permute-profile  $\sigma R$ )*  
 $\langle$ proof $\rangle$

This shows that the above definition is equivalent to that in the paper.

**lemma** *permute-profile-iff [simp]*:  
**fixes**  $R :: ('agent, 'alt) \text{ pref-profile}$   
**assumes**  $\sigma$  permutes alts  $x \in \text{alts } y \in \text{alts}$   
**defines**  $R' \equiv \text{permute-profile } \sigma R$   
**shows**  $\sigma x \preceq[R' i] \sigma y \longleftrightarrow x \preceq[R i] y$   
 $\langle$ proof $\rangle$

## 2.1 Pareto dominance

**definition** *Pareto* ::  $('agent \Rightarrow 'alt \text{ relation}) \Rightarrow 'alt \text{ relation}$  **where**  
 $x \preceq[\text{Pareto}(R)] y \longleftrightarrow (\exists j. x \preceq[R j] x) \wedge (\forall i. x \preceq[R i] x \longrightarrow x \preceq[R i] y)$

A Pareto loser is an alternative that is Pareto-dominated by some other alternative.

**definition** *pareto-losers* ::  $('agent, 'alt) \text{ pref-profile} \Rightarrow 'alt \text{ set}$  **where**  
 $\text{pareto-losers } R = \{x. \exists y. y \succ[\text{Pareto}(R)] x\}$

**lemma** *pareto-losersI [intro?, simp]*:  $y \succ[\text{Pareto}(R)] x \implies x \in \text{pareto-losers } R$   
 $\langle$ proof $\rangle$

**context** *preorder-family*  
**begin**

**lemma** *Pareto-iff*:  
 $x \preceq[\text{Pareto}(R)] y \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in \text{dom}. x \preceq[R i] y)$   
 $\langle$ proof $\rangle$

**lemma** *Pareto-strict-iff*:  
 $x \prec[\text{Pareto}(R)] y \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in \text{dom}. x \preceq[R i] y) \wedge (\exists i \in \text{dom}. x \prec[R i] y)$   
 $\langle$ proof $\rangle$

**lemma** *Pareto-strictI*:  
**assumes**  $\bigwedge i. i \in \text{dom} \implies x \preceq[R i] y \ i \in \text{dom } x \prec[R i] y$   
**shows**  $x \prec[\text{Pareto}(R)] y$   
 $\langle$ proof $\rangle$

**lemma** *Pareto-strictI'*:  
**assumes**  $\bigwedge i. i \in \text{dom} \implies x \preceq[R i] y \ i \in \text{dom } \neg x \succeq[R i] y$   
**shows**  $x \prec[\text{Pareto}(R)] y$   
 $\langle$ proof $\rangle$

**sublocale** *Pareto: preorder-on carrier Pareto(R)*  
 $\langle$ proof $\rangle$

**lemma** *pareto-loser-in-alts*:  
**assumes**  $x \in \text{pareto-losers } R$   
**shows**  $x \in \text{carrier}$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *pareto-losersE*:  
**assumes**  $x \in \text{pareto-losers } R$   
**obtains**  $y$  **where**  $y \in \text{carrier } y \succ [Pareto(R)] x$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**end**

## 2.2 Preferred alternatives

**context** *pref-profile-wf*  
**begin**

**lemma** *preferred-alts-subset-alts*:  $\text{preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x \subseteq \text{alts } (\text{is } ?A)$   
**and** *finite-preferred-alts* [*simp,intro!*]:  $\text{finite } (\text{preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x) \ (\text{is } ?B)$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *preferred-alts-altdef*:  
 $i \in \text{agents} \implies \text{preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x = \{y \in \text{alts}. y \succeq [R \ i] x\}$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**end**

## 2.3 Favourite alternatives

**definition** *favorites* ::  $(\text{'agent}, \text{'alt}) \text{ pref-profile} \Rightarrow \text{'agent} \Rightarrow \text{'alt set}$  **where**  
 $\text{favorites } R \ i = \text{Max-wrt } (R \ i)$

**definition** *favorite* ::  $(\text{'agent}, \text{'alt}) \text{ pref-profile} \Rightarrow \text{'agent} \Rightarrow \text{'alt}$  **where**  
 $\text{favorite } R \ i = \text{the-elem } (\text{favorites } R \ i)$

**definition** *has-unique-favorites* ::  $(\text{'agent}, \text{'alt}) \text{ pref-profile} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$  **where**  
 $\text{has-unique-favorites } R \longleftrightarrow (\forall i. \text{favorites } R \ i = \{\}) \vee \text{is-singleton } (\text{favorites } R \ i)$

**context** *pref-profile-wf*  
**begin**

**lemma** *favorites-altdef*:  
 $\text{favorites } R \ i = \text{Max-wrt-among } (R \ i) \ \text{alts}$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *favorites-no-agent* [*simp*]:  $i \notin \text{agents} \implies \text{favorites } R \ i = \{\}$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *favorites-altdef'*:

*favorites R i = {x ∈ alts. ∀ y ∈ alts. x  $\succeq$ [R i] y}*  
⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *favorites-subset-alts*: *favorites R i ⊆ alts*

⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *finite-favorites* [*simp, intro*]: *finite (favorites R i)*

⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *favorites-nonempty*: *i ∈ agents ⇒ favorites R i ≠ {}*

⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *favorites-permute*:

**assumes** *i: i ∈ agents and perm: σ permutes alts*

**shows** *favorites (permute-profile σ R) i = σ ' favorites R i*

⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *has-unique-favorites-altdef*:

*has-unique-favorites R ⇔ (∀ i ∈ agents. is-singleton (favorites R i))*

⟨*proof*⟩

**end**

**locale** *pref-profile-unique-favorites = pref-profile-wf agents alts R*

**for** *agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and R +*

**assumes** *unique-favorites'*: *has-unique-favorites R*

**begin**

**lemma** *unique-favorites*: *i ∈ agents ⇒ favorites R i = {favorite R i}*

⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *favorite-in-alts*: *i ∈ agents ⇒ favorite R i ∈ alts*

⟨*proof*⟩

**end**

## 2.4 Anonymous profiles

**type-synonym** (*'agent, 'alt*) *apref-profile = 'alt set list multiset*

**definition** *anonymous-profile :: ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile ⇒ ('agent, 'alt) apref-profile*

**where** *anonymous-profile-auxdef*:

*anonymous-profile R = image-mset (weak-ranking ∘ R) (mset-set {i. R i ≠ (λ-. False)})*

**lemma** (**in** *pref-profile-wf*) *agents-eq*:

$agents = \{i. R\ i \neq (\lambda\ -. False)\}$   
 $\langle proof \rangle$

**lemma** (in *pref-profile-wf*) *anonymous-profile-def*:  
 $anonymous-profile\ R = image-mset\ (weak-ranking\ \circ\ R)\ (mset-set\ agents)$   
 $\langle proof \rangle$

**lemma** (in *pref-profile-wf*) *anonymous-profile-permute*:  
**assumes**  $\sigma$  *permutes alts* *finite agents*  
**shows**  $anonymous-profile\ (permute-profile\ \sigma\ R) =$   
 $image-mset\ (map\ ((\cdot)\ \sigma))\ (anonymous-profile\ R)$   
 $\langle proof \rangle$

**lemma** (in *pref-profile-wf*) *anonymous-profile-update*:  
**assumes**  $i: i \in agents$  **and**  $fin\ [simp]:$  *finite agents* **and** *total-preorder-on alts*  
 $Ri'$   
**shows**  $anonymous-profile\ (R(i := Ri')) =$   
 $anonymous-profile\ R - \{\#weak-ranking\ (R\ i)\#\} + \{\#weak-ranking$   
 $Ri'\#\}$   
 $\langle proof \rangle$

## 2.5 Preference profiles from lists

**definition** *prefs-from-table* ::  $('agent \times 'alt\ set\ list)\ list \Rightarrow ('agent, 'alt)\ pref-profile$   
**where**  
 $prefs-from-table\ xss = (\lambda i. case-option\ (\lambda\ -. False)\ of-weak-ranking\ (map-of\ xss\ i))$

**definition** *prefs-from-table-wf* **where**  
 $prefs-from-table-wf\ agents\ alts\ xss \longleftrightarrow agents \neq \{\}\ \wedge\ alts \neq \{\}\ \wedge\ distinct\ (map\ fst\ xss) \wedge$   
 $set\ (map\ fst\ xss) = agents \wedge (\forall xs \in set\ (map\ snd\ xss). \bigcup (set\ xs) = alts \wedge$   
 $is-finite-weak-ranking\ xs)$

**lemma** *prefs-from-table-wfI*:  
**assumes**  $agents \neq \{\}$   $alts \neq \{\}$  *distinct*  $(map\ fst\ xss)$   
**assumes**  $set\ (map\ fst\ xss) = agents$   
**assumes**  $\bigwedge xs. xs \in set\ (map\ snd\ xss) \implies \bigcup (set\ xs) = alts$   
**assumes**  $\bigwedge xs. xs \in set\ (map\ snd\ xss) \implies is-finite-weak-ranking\ xs$   
**shows**  $prefs-from-table-wf\ agents\ alts\ xss$   
 $\langle proof \rangle$

**lemma** *prefs-from-table-wfD*:  
**assumes** *prefs-from-table-wf*  $agents\ alts\ xss$   
**shows**  $agents \neq \{\}$   $alts \neq \{\}$  *distinct*  $(map\ fst\ xss)$   
**and**  $set\ (map\ fst\ xss) = agents$   
**and**  $\bigwedge xs. xs \in set\ (map\ snd\ xss) \implies \bigcup (set\ xs) = alts$   
**and**  $\bigwedge xs. xs \in set\ (map\ snd\ xss) \implies is-finite-weak-ranking\ xs$   
 $\langle proof \rangle$

**lemma** *pref-profile-from-tableI*:

*prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss*  $\implies$  *pref-profile-wf agents alts (prefs-from-table xss)*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *prefs-from-table-eqI*:

**assumes** *distinct (map fst xs) distinct (map fst ys) set xs = set ys*  
**shows** *prefs-from-table xs = prefs-from-table ys*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *prefs-from-table-undef*:

**assumes** *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss i  $\notin$  agents*  
**shows** *prefs-from-table xss i = ( $\lambda$ -. False)*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *prefs-from-table-map-of*:

**assumes** *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss i  $\in$  agents*  
**shows** *prefs-from-table xss i = of-weak-ranking (the (map-of xss i))*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *prefs-from-table-update*:

**fixes** *x xs*  
**assumes** *i  $\in$  set (map fst xs)*  
**defines** *xs'  $\equiv$  map ( $\lambda(j,y)$ . if  $j = i$  then  $(j, x)$  else  $(j, y)$ ) xs*  
**shows** *(prefs-from-table xs)(i := of-weak-ranking x) =  
prefs-from-table xs' (is ?lhs = ?rhs)*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *prefs-from-table-swap*:

*x  $\neq$  y  $\implies$  prefs-from-table ((x,x')#(y,y')#xs) = prefs-from-table ((y,y')#(x,x')#xs)*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *permute-prefs-from-table*:

**assumes**  *$\sigma$  permutes fst ' set xs*  
**shows** *prefs-from-table xs  $\circ$   $\sigma$  = prefs-from-table (map ( $\lambda(x,y)$ . (inv  $\sigma$  x, y)) xs)*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *permute-profile-from-table*:

**assumes** *wf: prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss*  
**assumes** *perm:  $\sigma$  permutes alts*  
**shows** *permute-profile  $\sigma$  (prefs-from-table xss) =  
prefs-from-table (map ( $\lambda(x,y)$ . (x, map (( $\cdot$ )  $\sigma$ ) y)) xss) (is ?f = ?g)*  
*<proof>*

## 2.6 Automatic evaluation of preference profiles

**lemma** *eval-prefs-from-table [simp]*:

*prefs-from-table* []  $i = (\lambda - . \text{False})$   
*prefs-from-table* (( $i, y$ ) #  $xs$ )  $i = \text{of-weak-ranking } y$   
 $i \neq j \implies \text{prefs-from-table } ((j, y) \# xs) i = \text{prefs-from-table } xs i$   
 <proof>

**lemma** *eval-of-weak-ranking* [simp]:

$a \notin \bigcup (\text{set } xs) \implies \neg \text{of-weak-ranking } xs a b$   
 $b \in x \implies a \in \bigcup (\text{set } (x \# xs)) \implies \text{of-weak-ranking } (x \# xs) a b$   
 $b \notin x \implies \text{of-weak-ranking } (x \# xs) a b \longleftrightarrow \text{of-weak-ranking } xs a b$   
 <proof>

**lemma** *prefs-from-table-cong* [cong]:

**assumes** *prefs-from-table*  $xs = \text{prefs-from-table } ys$   
**shows** *prefs-from-table* ( $x \# xs$ ) = *prefs-from-table* ( $x \# ys$ )  
 <proof>

**definition** *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge* **where**

*of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge*  $xs x = \{y. \text{of-weak-ranking } xs y x\}$

**lemma** *eval-Collect-of-weak-ranking*:

*Collect* (*of-weak-ranking*  $xs x$ ) = *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge* (*rev*  $xs$ )  $x$   
 <proof>

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-empty* [simp]:

*of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge* []  $x = \{\}$   
 <proof>

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-Cons* [simp]:

$y \in x \implies \text{of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge } (x \# xs) y = \bigcup (\text{set } (x \# xs))$   
 $y \notin x \implies \text{of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge } (x \# xs) y = \text{of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge } xs y$   
 <proof>

**lemma** *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-Cons'*:

*of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge* ( $x \# xs$ ) =  $(\lambda y.$   
 (if  $y \in x$  then  $\bigcup (\text{set } (x \# xs))$  else *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge*  $xs y$ )  
 <proof>

**lemma** *anonymise-prefs-from-table*:

**assumes** *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts*  $xs$   
**shows** *anonymous-profile* (*prefs-from-table*  $xs$ ) = *mset* (*map snd*  $xs$ )  
 <proof>

**lemma** *prefs-from-table-agent-permutation*:

**assumes** *wf*: *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts*  $xs$  *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts*  $ys$   
**assumes** *mset-eq*: *mset* (*map snd*  $xs$ ) = *mset* (*map snd*  $ys$ )  
**obtains**  $\pi$  **where**  $\pi$  *permutes agents* *prefs-from-table*  $xs \circ \pi = \text{prefs-from-table } ys$   
 <proof>

**lemma** *permute-list-distinct*:

**assumes**  $f \text{ ' } \{..<length\ xs\} \subseteq \{..<length\ xs\} \text{ distinct } xs$   
**shows**  $permute\text{-list } f\ xs = map\ (\lambda x. xs ! f\ (index\ xs\ x))\ xs$   
(*proof*)

**lemma** *image-mset-eq-permutation*:

**assumes**  $\{\#f\ x. x \in \# \text{ mset-set } A\#\} = \{\#g\ x. x \in \# \text{ mset-set } A\#\}$  *finite A*  
**obtains**  $\pi$  **where**  $\pi$  *permutes A*  $\wedge x. x \in A \implies g\ (\pi\ x) = f\ x$   
(*proof*)

**lemma** *anonymous-profile-agent-permutation*:

**assumes** *eq*: *anonymous-profile R1 = anonymous-profile R2*  
**assumes** *wf*: *pref-profile-wf agents alts R1 pref-profile-wf agents alts R2*  
**assumes** *fin*: *finite agents*  
**obtains**  $\pi$  **where**  $\pi$  *permutes agents R2*  $\circ \pi = R1$   
(*proof*)

**end**

**theory** *Elections*

**imports** *Preference-Profiles*

**begin**

An election consists of a finite set of agents and a finite non-empty set of alternatives.

**locale** *election* =

**fixes** *agents* :: '*agent set* **and** *alts* :: '*alt set*  
**assumes** *finite-agents* [*simp, intro*]: *finite agents*  
**assumes** *finite-alts* [*simp, intro*]: *finite alts*  
**assumes** *nonempty-agents* [*simp*]: *agents*  $\neq \{\}$   
**assumes** *nonempty-alts* [*simp*]: *alts*  $\neq \{\}$

**begin**

**abbreviation** *is-pref-profile*  $\equiv$  *pref-profile-wf agents alts*

**lemma** *finite-total-preorder-on-iff'* [*simp*]:

*finite-total-preorder-on alts R*  $\longleftrightarrow$  *total-preorder-on alts R*  
(*proof*)

**lemma** *pref-profile-wfI'* [*intro?*]:

$(\wedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies \text{total-preorder-on alts } (R\ i)) \implies$   
 $(\wedge i. i \notin \text{agents} \implies R\ i = (\lambda - . \text{False})) \implies \text{is-pref-profile } R$   
(*proof*)

**lemma** *is-pref-profile-update* [*simp,intro*]:

**assumes** *is-pref-profile R total-preorder-on alts Ri' i*  $i \in \text{agents}$   
**shows** *is-pref-profile*  $(R(i := Ri'))$   
(*proof*)

**lemma** *election* [*simp,intro*]: *election agents alts*

*<proof>*

**context**

**fixes**  $R$  **assumes**  $R$ : *total-preorder-on alts*  $R$

**begin**

**interpretation**  $R$ : *total-preorder-on alts*  $R$  *<proof>*

**lemma** *Max-wrt-prefs-finite: finite* (*Max-wrt*  $R$ )

*<proof>*

**lemma** *Max-wrt-prefs-nonempty: Max-wrt*  $R \neq \{\}$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *maximal-imp-preferred:*

$x \in \text{alts} \implies \text{Max-wrt } R \subseteq \text{preferred-alts } R \ x$

*<proof>*

**end**

**end**

**end**

### 3 Auxiliary facts about PMFs

**theory** *Lotteries*

**imports** *Complex-Main HOL-Probability.Probability*

**begin**

The type of lotteries (a probability mass function)

**type-synonym** *'alt lottery = 'alt pmf*

**definition** *lotteries-on* :: *'a set*  $\Rightarrow$  *'a lottery set* **where**

*lotteries-on*  $A = \{p. \text{set-pmf } p \subseteq A\}$

**lemma** *pmf-of-set-lottery:*

$A \neq \{\} \implies \text{finite } A \implies A \subseteq B \implies \text{pmf-of-set } A \in \text{lotteries-on } B$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *pmf-of-list-lottery:*

$\text{pmf-of-list-wf } xs \implies \text{set } (\text{map fst } xs) \subseteq A \implies \text{pmf-of-list } xs \in \text{lotteries-on } A$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *return-pmf-in-lotteries-on* [*simp,intro*]:

$x \in A \implies \text{return-pmf } x \in \text{lotteries-on } A$

*<proof>*

```

end
theory Utility-Functions
imports
  Complex-Main
  HOL-Probability.Probability
  Lotteries
  Preference-Profiles
begin

```

### 3.1 Definition of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions

```

locale vnm-utility = finite-total-preorder-on +
  fixes  $u :: 'a \Rightarrow \text{real}$ 
  assumes utility-le-iff:  $x \in \text{carrier} \Longrightarrow y \in \text{carrier} \Longrightarrow u\ x \leq u\ y \longleftrightarrow x \preceq[\text{le}]\ y$ 
begin

```

```

lemma utility-le:  $x \preceq[\text{le}]\ y \Longrightarrow u\ x \leq u\ y$ 
  <proof>

```

```

lemma utility-less-iff:
   $x \in \text{carrier} \Longrightarrow y \in \text{carrier} \Longrightarrow u\ x < u\ y \longleftrightarrow x \prec[\text{le}]\ y$ 
  <proof>

```

```

lemma utility-less:  $x \prec[\text{le}]\ y \Longrightarrow u\ x < u\ y$ 
  <proof>

```

The following lemma allows us to compute the expected utility by summing over all indifference classes, using the fact that alternatives in the same indifference class must have the same utility.

```

lemma expected-utility-weak-ranking:
  assumes  $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$ 
  shows  $\text{measure-pmf.expectation } p\ u =$ 
     $(\sum A \leftarrow \text{weak-ranking } \text{le. } u\ (\text{SOME } x. x \in A) * \text{measure-pmf.prob } p\ A)$ 
  <proof>

```

```

lemma scaled:  $c > 0 \Longrightarrow \text{vnm-utility carrier } \text{le } (\lambda x. c * u\ x)$ 
  <proof>

```

```

lemma add-right:
  assumes  $\bigwedge x\ y. \text{le } x\ y \Longrightarrow f\ x \leq f\ y$ 
  shows  $\text{vnm-utility carrier } \text{le } (\lambda x. u\ x + f\ x)$ 
  <proof>

```

```

lemma add-left:
   $(\bigwedge x\ y. \text{le } x\ y \Longrightarrow f\ x \leq f\ y) \Longrightarrow \text{vnm-utility carrier } \text{le } (\lambda x. f\ x + u\ x)$ 
  <proof>

```

Given a consistent utility function, any function that assigns equal values to

equivalent alternatives can be added to it (scaled with a sufficiently small  $\varepsilon$ ), again yielding a consistent utility function.

**lemma** *add-epsilon*:

**assumes**  $A: \bigwedge x y. le\ x\ y \implies le\ y\ x \implies f\ x = f\ y$

**shows**  $\exists \varepsilon > 0. vnm\text{-utility\ carrier}\ le\ (\lambda x. u\ x + \varepsilon * f\ x)$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *diff-epsilon*:

**assumes**  $\bigwedge x y. le\ x\ y \implies le\ y\ x \implies f\ x = f\ y$

**shows**  $\exists \varepsilon > 0. vnm\text{-utility\ carrier}\ le\ (\lambda x. u\ x - \varepsilon * f\ x)$

*<proof>*

**end**

**end**

## 4 Stochastic Dominance

**theory** *Stochastic-Dominance*

**imports**

*Complex-Main*

*HOL-Probability.Probability*

*Lotteries*

*Preference-Profiles*

*Utility-Functions*

**begin**

### 4.1 Definition of Stochastic Dominance

This is the definition of stochastic dominance. It lifts a preference relation on alternatives to the stochastic dominance ordering on lotteries.

**definition** *SD* :: 'alt relation  $\implies$  'alt lottery relation **where**

$$p \succeq[SD(R)]\ q \iff p \in \text{lotteries-on } \{x. R\ x\ x\} \wedge q \in \text{lotteries-on } \{x. R\ x\ x\} \wedge$$

$$(\forall x. R\ x\ x \longrightarrow \text{measure-pmf.prob } p\ \{y. y \succeq[R]\ x\} \geq$$

$$\text{measure-pmf.prob } q\ \{y. y \succeq[R]\ x\})$$

**lemma** *SD-empty [simp]*:  $SD\ (\lambda - . False) = (\lambda - . False)$

*<proof>*

Stochastic dominance over any relation is a preorder.

**lemma** *SD-refl*:  $p \preceq[SD(R)]\ p \iff p \in \text{lotteries-on } \{x. R\ x\ x\}$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-trans [simp, trans]*:  $p \preceq[SD(R)]\ q \implies q \preceq[SD(R)]\ r \implies p \preceq[SD(R)]\ r$

*r*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-is-preorder*: *preorder-on* (*lotteries-on*  $\{x. R\ x\ x\}$ ) (*SD* *R*)  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**context** *preorder-on*  
**begin**

**lemma** *SD-preorder*:  
 $p \succeq[SD(le)]\ q \iff p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier} \wedge q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier} \wedge$   
 $(\forall x \in \text{carrier}. \text{measure-pmf.prob } p \text{ (preferred-alts } le\ x) \geq$   
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } q \text{ (preferred-alts } le\ x))$   
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *SD-preorderI* [*intro?*]:  
**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$   $q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$   
**assumes**  $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{carrier} \implies$   
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } p \text{ (preferred-alts } le\ x) \geq \text{measure-pmf.prob } q$   
 (*preferred-alts* *le* *x*)  
**shows**  $p \succeq[SD(le)]\ q$   
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *SD-preorderD*:  
**assumes**  $p \succeq[SD(le)]\ q$   
**shows**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$   $q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$   
**and**  $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{carrier} \implies$   
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } p \text{ (preferred-alts } le\ x) \geq \text{measure-pmf.prob } q$   
 (*preferred-alts* *le* *x*)  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *SD-refl'* [*simp*]:  $p \preceq[SD(le)]\ p \iff p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$   
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *SD-is-preorder'*: *preorder-on* (*lotteries-on carrier*) (*SD*(*le*))  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *SD-singleton-left*:  
**assumes**  $x \in \text{carrier}$   $q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$   
**shows**  $\text{return-pmf } x \preceq[SD(le)]\ q \iff (\forall y \in \text{set-pmf } q. x \preceq[le]\ y)$   
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *SD-singleton-right*:  
**assumes**  $x: x \in \text{carrier}$  **and**  $q: q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$   
**shows**  $q \preceq[SD(le)]\ \text{return-pmf } x \iff (\forall y \in \text{set-pmf } q. y \preceq[le]\ x)$   
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *SD-strict-singleton-left*:  
**assumes**  $x \in \text{carrier}$   $q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$   
**shows**  $\text{return-pmf } x \prec[SD(le)]\ q \iff (\forall y \in \text{set-pmf } q. x \preceq[le]\ y) \wedge (\exists y \in \text{set-pmf}$   
 $q. (x \prec[le]\ y))$   
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *SD-strict-singleton-right*:

**assumes**  $x \in \text{carrier } q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$

**shows**  $q \prec[SD(le)] \text{return-pmf } x \longleftrightarrow (\forall y \in \text{set-pmf } q. y \preceq[le] x) \wedge (\exists y \in \text{set-pmf } q. (y \prec[le] x))$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-singleton [simp]*:

$x \in \text{carrier} \implies y \in \text{carrier} \implies \text{return-pmf } x \preceq[SD(le)] \text{return-pmf } y \longleftrightarrow x \preceq[le] y$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-strict-singleton [simp]*:

$x \in \text{carrier} \implies y \in \text{carrier} \implies \text{return-pmf } x \prec[SD(le)] \text{return-pmf } y \longleftrightarrow x \prec[le] y$   
*<proof>*

**end**

**context** *pref-profile-wf*

**begin**

**context**

**fixes**  $i$  **assumes**  $i \in \text{agents}$

**begin**

**interpretation** *Ri*: *preorder-on alts R i <proof>*

**lemmas** *SD-singleton-left = Ri.SD-singleton-left*

**lemmas** *SD-singleton-right = Ri.SD-singleton-right*

**lemmas** *SD-strict-singleton-left = Ri.SD-strict-singleton-left*

**lemmas** *SD-strict-singleton-right = Ri.SD-strict-singleton-right*

**lemmas** *SD-singleton = Ri.SD-singleton*

**lemmas** *SD-strict-singleton = Ri.SD-strict-singleton*

**end**

**end**

**lemmas** (**in** *pref-profile-wf*) [*simp*] = *SD-singleton SD-strict-singleton*

## 4.2 Stochastic Dominance for preference profiles

**context** *pref-profile-wf*

**begin**

**lemma** *SD-pref-profile*:

**assumes**  $i \in \text{agents}$

**shows**  $p \succeq[SD(R i)] q \longleftrightarrow p \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \wedge q \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \wedge$   
 $(\forall x \in \text{alts. measure-pmf.prob } p (\text{preferred-alts } (R i) x) \geq$

*measure-pmf.prob q (preferred-alts (R i) x)*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-pref-profileI* [*intro?*]:

**assumes**  $i \in \text{agents } p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**assumes**  $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{alts} \implies$

*measure-pmf.prob p (preferred-alts (R i) x)  $\geq$*

*measure-pmf.prob q (preferred-alts (R i) x)*

**shows**  $p \succeq_{[SD(R i)]} q$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-pref-profileD*:

**assumes**  $i \in \text{agents } p \succeq_{[SD(R i)]} q$

**shows**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**and**  $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{alts} \implies$

*measure-pmf.prob p (preferred-alts (R i) x)  $\geq$*

*measure-pmf.prob q (preferred-alts (R i) x)*

*<proof>*

**end**

### 4.3 SD efficient lotteries

**definition** *SD-efficient* :: (*'agent, 'alt*) *pref-profile*  $\Rightarrow$  *'alt lottery*  $\Rightarrow$  *bool* **where**

*SD-efficient-auxdef*:

*SD-efficient R p*  $\longleftrightarrow \neg(\exists q \in \text{lotteries-on } \{x. \exists i. R i x x\}. q \succ_{[Pareto (SD \circ R)]} p)$

**context** *pref-profile-wf*

**begin**

**sublocale** *SD*: *preorder-family agents lotteries-on alts SD  $\circ$  R* *<proof>*

A lottery is considered SD-efficient if there is no other lottery such that all agents weakly prefer the other lottery (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) and at least one agent strongly prefers the other lottery.

**lemma** *SD-efficient-def*:

*SD-efficient R p*  $\longleftrightarrow \neg(\exists q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}. q \succ_{[Pareto (SD \circ R)]} p)$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-efficient-def'*:

*SD-efficient R p*  $\longleftrightarrow$

$\neg(\exists q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}. (\forall i \in \text{agents}. q \succeq_{[SD(R i)]} p) \wedge (\exists i \in \text{agents}. q \succ_{[SD(R i)]} p))$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-inefficientI*:

**assumes**  $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \bigwedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q \succeq_{[SD(R i)]} p$

$i \in \text{agents } q \succ [SD(R \ i)] \ p$   
**shows**  $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ p$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *SD-inefficientI'*:

**assumes**  $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \wedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q \succeq [SD(R \ i)] \ p$   
 $\exists i \in \text{agents}. q \succ [SD(R \ i)] \ p$   
**shows**  $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ p$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *SD-inefficientE*:

**assumes**  $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ p$   
**obtains**  $q \ i$  **where**  
 $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \wedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q \succeq [SD(R \ i)] \ p$   
 $i \in \text{agents } q \succ [SD(R \ i)] \ p$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *SD-efficientD*:

**assumes**  $SD\text{-efficient } R \ p \ q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$   
**and**  $\wedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q \succeq [SD(R \ i)] \ p \ \exists i \in \text{agents}. \neg(q \preceq [SD(R \ i)] \ p)$   
**shows** *False*  
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *SD-efficient-singleton-iff*:

**assumes**  $[simp]: x \in \text{alts}$   
**shows**  $SD\text{-efficient } R \ (\text{return-pmf } x) \longleftrightarrow x \notin \text{pareto-losers } R$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**end**

## 4.4 Equivalence proof

We now show that a lottery is preferred w.r.t. Stochastic Dominance iff it yields more expected utility for all compatible utility functions.

**context** *finite-total-preorder-on*  
**begin**

**abbreviation**  $is\text{-vnm-utility} \equiv vnm\text{-utility carrier } le$

**lemma** *utility-weak-ranking-index*:

$is\text{-vnm-utility } (\lambda x. \text{real } (\text{length } (\text{weak-ranking } le) - \text{weak-ranking-index } x))$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *SD-iff-expected-utilities-le*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier } q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$   
**shows**  $p \preceq [SD(le)] \ q \longleftrightarrow$   
 $(\forall u. is\text{-vnm-utility } u \longrightarrow \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p \ u \leq \text{measure-pmf.expectation } q \ u)$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *not-strict-SD-iff*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier } q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$

**shows**  $\neg(p \prec[SD(le)] q) \longleftrightarrow$

$(\exists u. \text{is-vnm-utility } u \wedge \text{measure-pmf.expectation } q \ u \leq \text{measure-pmf.expectation}$

$p \ u)$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *strict-SD-iff*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier } q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$

**shows**  $(p \prec[SD(le)] q) \longleftrightarrow$

$(\forall u. \text{is-vnm-utility } u \longrightarrow \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p \ u < \text{mea-}$

$\text{sure-pmf.expectation } q \ u)$

*<proof>*

**end**

**end**

**theory** *SD-Efficiency*

**imports** *Complex-Main Preference-Profiles Lotteries Stochastic-Dominance*

**begin**

**context** *pref-profile-wf*

**begin**

**lemma** *SD-inefficient-support-subset*:

**assumes** *inefficient*:  $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ p'$

**assumes** *support*:  $\text{set-pmf } p' \subseteq \text{set-pmf } p$

**assumes** *lotteries*:  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**shows**  $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ p$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-efficient-support-subset*:

**assumes** *SD-efficient*:  $SD\text{-efficient } R \ p$  *set-pmf*:  $p' \subseteq \text{set-pmf } p$   $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**shows**  $SD\text{-efficient } R \ p'$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-efficient-same-support*:

**assumes** *set-pmf*:  $p = \text{set-pmf } p'$   $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**shows**  $SD\text{-efficient } R \ p \longleftrightarrow SD\text{-efficient } R \ p'$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-efficient-iff*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**shows**  $SD\text{-efficient } R \ p \longleftrightarrow SD\text{-efficient } R \ (pmf\text{-of-set } (set\text{-pmf } p))$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *SD-efficient-no-pareto-loser*:

**assumes** *efficient*:  $SD\text{-efficient } R \ p$  **and** *p-wf*:  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**shows**  $set\text{-pmf } p \cap \text{pareto-losers } R = \{\}$

⟨proof⟩

Given two lotteries with the same support where one is strictly Pareto-SD-preferred to the other, one can construct a third lottery that is weakly Pareto-SD-preferred to the better lottery (and therefore strictly Pareto-SD-preferred to the worse lottery) and whose support is a strict subset of the original supports.

**lemma** *improve-lottery-support-subset*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$   $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$   $q \succ [Pareto(SD \circ R)] \ p$   
 $set\text{-pmf } p = set\text{-pmf } q$

**obtains**  $r$  **where**  $r \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$   $r \succeq [Pareto(SD \circ R)] \ q$   $set\text{-pmf } r \subset set\text{-pmf } p$

⟨proof⟩

## 4.5 Existence of SD-efficient lotteries

In this section, we will show that any lottery can be ‘improved’ to an SD-efficient lottery, i.e. for any lottery, there exists an SD-efficient lottery that is weakly SD-preferred to the original one by all agents.

**context**

**fixes**  $p :: 'alt \text{ lottery}$

**assumes** *lott*:  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**begin**

**private definition** *improve-lottery* ::  $'alt \text{ lottery} \Rightarrow 'alt \text{ lottery}$  **where**

*improve-lottery*  $q = (\text{let } A = \{r \in \text{lotteries-on alts}. r \succ [Pareto(SD \circ R)] \ q\}$  in  
 (SOME  $r. r \in A \wedge \neg(\exists r' \in A. set\text{-pmf } r' \subset set\text{-pmf } r)$ ))

**private lemma** *improve-lottery*:

**assumes**  $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ q$

**defines**  $r \equiv \text{improve-lottery } q$

**shows**  $r \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$   $r \succ [Pareto(SD \circ R)] \ q$

$\bigwedge r'. r' \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \implies r' \succ [Pareto(SD \circ R)] \ q \implies \neg(set\text{-pmf } r' \subset set\text{-pmf } r)$

⟨proof⟩ **fun** *sd-chain* ::  $\text{nat} \Rightarrow 'alt \text{ lottery option}$  **where**

*sd-chain* 0 = Some  $p$

| *sd-chain* (Suc  $n$ ) =

(case *sd-chain*  $n$  of

None  $\Rightarrow$  None

| Some  $p \Rightarrow$  if  $SD\text{-efficient } R \ p$  then None else Some (*improve-lottery*  $p$ ))

**private lemma** *sd-chain-None-propagate*:

$m \geq n \implies \text{sd-chain } n = \text{None} \implies \text{sd-chain } m = \text{None}$   
 ⟨proof⟩ **lemma** *sd-chain-Some-propagate*:  
 $m \geq n \implies \text{sd-chain } m = \text{Some } q \implies \exists q'. \text{sd-chain } n = \text{Some } q'$   
 ⟨proof⟩ **lemma** *sd-chain-NoneD*:  
 $\text{sd-chain } n = \text{None} \implies \exists n p. \text{sd-chain } n = \text{Some } p \wedge \text{SD-efficient } R p$   
 ⟨proof⟩ **lemma** *sd-chain-lottery*:  $\text{sd-chain } n = \text{Some } q \implies q \in \text{lotteries-on } \text{alts}$   
 ⟨proof⟩ **lemma** *sd-chain-Suc*:  
**assumes**  $\text{sd-chain } m = \text{Some } q$   
**assumes**  $\text{sd-chain } (\text{Suc } m) = \text{Some } r$   
**shows**  $q \prec_{[\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)]} r$   
 ⟨proof⟩ **lemma** *sd-chain-strictly-preferred*:  
**assumes**  $m < n$   
**assumes**  $\text{sd-chain } m = \text{Some } q$   
**assumes**  $\text{sd-chain } n = \text{Some } s$   
**shows**  $q \prec_{[\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)]} s$   
 ⟨proof⟩ **lemma** *sd-chain-preferred*:  
**assumes**  $m \leq n$   
**assumes**  $\text{sd-chain } m = \text{Some } q$   
**assumes**  $\text{sd-chain } n = \text{Some } s$   
**shows**  $q \preceq_{[\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)]} s$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *SD-efficient-lottery-exists*:  
**obtains**  $q$  **where**  $q \in \text{lotteries-on } \text{alts}$   $q \succeq_{[\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)]} p$   $\text{SD-efficient } R q$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**end**

**lemma**  
**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on } \text{alts}$   
**shows**  $\exists q \in \text{lotteries-on } \text{alts}. q \succeq_{[\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)]} p \wedge \text{SD-efficient } R q$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**end**

**end**

## 5 Social Decision Schemes

**theory** *Social-Decision-Schemes*  
**imports**  
*Complex-Main*  
*HOL-Probability.Probability*  
*Preference-Profiles*  
*Elections*  
*Order-Predicates*  
*Stochastic-Dominance*  
*SD-Efficiency*  
**begin**

## 5.1 Basic Social Choice definitions

**context** *election*  
**begin**

The set of lotteries, i.e. the probability mass functions on the type *'alt* whose support is a subset of the alternative set.

**abbreviation** *lotteries where*  
*lotteries*  $\equiv$  *lotteries-on alts*

The probability that a lottery returns an alternative that is in the given set

**abbreviation** *lottery-prob* :: *'alt lottery*  $\Rightarrow$  *'alt set*  $\Rightarrow$  *real where*  
*lottery-prob*  $\equiv$  *measure-pmf.prob*

**lemma** *lottery-prob-alts-superset:*  
**assumes**  $p \in$  *lotteries alts*  $\subseteq$   $A$   
**shows** *lottery-prob*  $p$   $A = 1$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *lottery-prob-alts:*  $p \in$  *lotteries*  $\implies$  *lottery-prob*  $p$  *alts*  $= 1$   
*<proof>*

**end**

In the context of an election, a preference profile is a function that assigns to each agent her preference relation (which is a total preorder)

## 5.2 Social Decision Schemes

In the context of an election, a Social Decision Scheme (SDS) is a function that maps preference profiles to lotteries on the alternatives.

**locale** *social-decision-scheme* = *election agents alts*  
**for** *agents* :: *'agent set* **and** *alts* :: *'alt set* +  
**fixes** *sds* :: (*'agent, 'alt*) *pref-profile*  $\Rightarrow$  *'alt lottery*  
**assumes** *sds-wf:* *is-pref-profile*  $R \implies$  *sds*  $R \in$  *lotteries*

## 5.3 Anonymity

An SDS is anonymous if permuting the agents in the input does not change the result.

**locale** *anonymous-sds* = *social-decision-scheme agents alts sds*  
**for** *agents* :: *'agent set* **and** *alts* :: *'alt set* **and** *sds* +  
**assumes** *anonymous:*  $\pi$  *permutes agents*  $\implies$  *is-pref-profile*  $R \implies$  *sds*  $(R \circ \pi) =$   
*sds*  $R$   
**begin**

**lemma** *anonymity-prefs-from-table:*

```

assumes prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs prefs-from-table-wf agents alts ys
assumes mset (map snd xs) = mset (map snd ys)
shows sds (prefs-from-table xs) = sds (prefs-from-table ys)
⟨proof⟩

```

**context**

**begin**

**qualified lemma** *anonymity-prefs-from-table-aux:*

```

assumes R1 = prefs-from-table xs prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs

```

```

assumes R2 = prefs-from-table ys prefs-from-table-wf agents alts ys

```

```

assumes mset (map snd xs) = mset (map snd ys)

```

```

shows sds R1 = sds R2 ⟨proof⟩

```

**end**

**end**

## 5.4 Neutrality

An SDS is neutral if permuting the alternatives in the input does not change the result, modulo the equivalent permutation in the output lottery.

```

locale neutral-sds = social-decision-scheme agents alts sds
for agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and sds +
assumes neutral: σ permutes alts ⇒ is-pref-profile R ⇒
sds (permute-profile σ R) = map-pmf σ (sds R)

```

**begin**

Alternative formulation of neutrality that shows that our definition is equivalent to that in the paper.

**lemma** *neutral':*

```

assumes σ permutes alts

```

```

assumes is-pref-profile R

```

```

assumes a ∈ alts

```

```

shows pmf (sds (permute-profile σ R)) (σ a) = pmf (sds R) a

```

⟨*proof*⟩

**end**

**locale** *an-sds =*

```

anonymous-sds agents alts sds + neutral-sds agents alts sds

```

```

for agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and sds

```

**begin**

**lemma** *sds-anonymous-neutral:*

```

assumes perm: σ permutes alts and wf: is-pref-profile R1 is-pref-profile R2

```

```

assumes eq: anonymous-profile R1 =

```

```

image-mset (map ((^) σ)) (anonymous-profile R2)

```

```

shows sds R1 = map-pmf σ (sds R2)

```

*<proof>*

**lemma** *sds-anonymous-neutral'*:

**assumes** *perm*:  $\sigma$  permutes alts **and** *wf*: *is-pref-profile R1 is-pref-profile R2*

**assumes** *eq*: *anonymous-profile R1 =*

*image-mset (map (( $\cdot$ )  $\sigma$ )) (anonymous-profile R2)*

**shows**  $\text{pmf } (sds R1) (\sigma x) = \text{pmf } (sds R2) x$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *sds-automorphism*:

**assumes** *perm*:  $\sigma$  permutes alts **and** *wf*: *is-pref-profile R*

**assumes** *eq*: *image-mset (map (( $\cdot$ )  $\sigma$ )) (anonymous-profile R) = anonymous-profile R*

**shows**  $\text{map-pmf } \sigma (sds R) = sds R$

*<proof>*

**end**

**lemma** *an-sds-automorphism-aux*:

**assumes** *wf*: *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts yss R  $\equiv$  prefs-from-table yss*

**assumes** *an*: *an-sds agents alts sds*

**assumes** *eq*: *mset (map ((map (( $\cdot$ ) (permutation-of-list xs)))  $\circ$  snd) yss) = mset (map snd yss)*

**assumes** *perm*:  $\text{set } (map \text{fst } xs) \subseteq \text{alts set } (map \text{snd } xs) = \text{set } (map \text{fst } xs)$   
*distinct (map fst xs)*

**and**  $x \in \text{alts } y = \text{permutation-of-list } xs \ x$

**shows**  $\text{pmf } (sds R) x = \text{pmf } (sds R) y$

*<proof>*

## 5.5 Ex-post efficiency

**locale** *ex-post-efficient-sds = social-decision-scheme agents alts sds*

**for** *agents* :: 'agent set **and** *alts* :: 'alt set **and** *sds* +

**assumes** *ex-post-efficient*:

*is-pref-profile R  $\implies$  set-pmf (sds R)  $\cap$  pareto-losers R = {}*

**begin**

**lemma** *ex-post-efficient'*:

**assumes** *is-pref-profile R*  $y \succ [Pareto(R)] x$

**shows**  $\text{pmf } (sds R) x = 0$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *ex-post-efficient''*:

**assumes** *is-pref-profile R*  $i \in \text{agents}$   $\forall i \in \text{agents}. y \succeq [R \ i] x \neg y \preceq [R \ i] x$

**shows**  $\text{pmf } (sds R) x = 0$

*<proof>*

**end**

## 5.6 SD efficiency

An SDS is SD-efficient if it returns an SD-efficient lottery for every preference profile, i.e. if the SDS outputs a lottery, it is never the case that there is another lottery that is weakly preferred by all agents and strictly preferred by at least one agent.

**locale** *sd-efficient-sds* = *social-decision-scheme agents alts sds*  
**for** *agents* :: 'agent set **and** *alts* :: 'alt set **and** *sds* +  
**assumes** *SD-efficient*: *is-pref-profile R*  $\implies$  *SD-efficient R (sds R)*  
**begin**

An alternative formulation of SD-efficiency that is somewhat more convenient to use.

**lemma** *SD-efficient'*:  
**assumes** *is-pref-profile R q*  $\in$  *lotteries*  
**assumes**  $\bigwedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q \succeq [SD(R\ i)]\ sds\ R\ i \in \text{agents}$   $q \succ [SD(R\ i)]\ sds\ R$   
**shows** *P*  
*<proof>*

Any SD-efficient SDS is also ex-post efficient.

**sublocale** *ex-post-efficient-sds*  
*<proof>*

The following rule can be used to derive facts from inefficient supports: If a set of alternatives is an inefficient support, at least one of the alternatives in it must receive probability 0.

**lemma** *SD-inefficient-support*:  
**assumes** *A*:  $A \neq \{\}$   $A \subseteq \text{alts}$  **and** *inefficient*:  $\neg SD\text{-efficient}\ R\ (\text{pmf-of-set}\ A)$   
**assumes** *wf*: *is-pref-profile R*  
**shows**  $\exists x \in A. \text{pmf}\ (sds\ R)\ x = 0$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *SD-inefficient-support'*:  
**assumes** *wf*: *is-pref-profile R*  
**assumes** *A*:  $A \neq \{\}$   $A \subseteq \text{alts}$  **and**  
*wit*:  $p \in \text{lotteries} \forall i \in \text{agents}. p \succeq [SD(R\ i)]\ \text{pmf-of-set}\ A\ i \in \text{agents}$   
 $\neg p \preceq [SD(R\ i)]\ \text{pmf-of-set}\ A$   
**shows**  $\exists x \in A. \text{pmf}\ (sds\ R)\ x = 0$   
*<proof>*

**end**

## 5.7 Weak strategyproofness

**context** *social-decision-scheme*  
**begin**

The SDS is said to be manipulable for a particular preference profile, a particular agent, and a particular alternative preference ordering for that

agent if the lottery obtained if the agent submits the alternative preferences strictly SD-dominates that obtained if the original preferences are submitted. (SD-dominated w.r.t. the original preferences)

**definition** *manipulable-profile*

$:: ('agent, 'alt) \text{ pref-profile} \Rightarrow 'agent \Rightarrow 'alt \text{ relation} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$  **where**  
*manipulable-profile*  $R \ i \ Ri' \longleftrightarrow \text{sds } (R(i := Ri')) \succ_{[SD (R \ i)]} \text{sds } R$

**end**

An SDS is weakly strategyproof (or just strategyproof) if it is not manipulable for any combination of preference profiles, agents, and alternative preference relations.

**locale** *strategyproof-sds = social-decision-scheme agents alts sds*

**for** *agents*  $:: 'agent \text{ set}$  **and** *alts*  $:: 'alt \text{ set}$  **and** *sds*  $+$

**assumes** *strategyproof*:

*is-pref-profile*  $R \Longrightarrow i \in \text{agents} \Longrightarrow \text{total-preorder-on alts } Ri' \Longrightarrow$   
 $\neg \text{manipulable-profile } R \ i \ Ri'$

## 5.8 Strong strategyproofness

**context** *social-decision-scheme*

**begin**

The SDS is said to be strongly strategyproof for a particular preference profile, a particular agent, and a particular alternative preference ordering for that agent if the lottery obtained if the agent submits the alternative preferences is SD-dominated by the one obtained if the original preferences are submitted. (SD-dominated w.r.t. the original preferences)

In other words: the SDS is strategyproof w.r.t the preference profile  $R$  and the agent  $i$  and the alternative preference relation  $R'_i$  if the lottery for obtained for  $R$  is at least as good for  $i$  as the lottery obtained when  $i$  misrepresents her preferences as  $R'_i$ .

**definition** *strongly-strategyproof-profile*

$:: ('agent, 'alt) \text{ pref-profile} \Rightarrow 'agent \Rightarrow 'alt \text{ relation} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$  **where**  
*strongly-strategyproof-profile*  $R \ i \ Ri' \longleftrightarrow \text{sds } R \succeq_{[SD (R \ i)]} \text{sds } (R(i := Ri'))$

**lemma** *strongly-strategyproof-profileI* [*intro*]:

**assumes** *is-pref-profile*  $R$  *total-preorder-on alts*  $Ri' \ i \in \text{agents}$

**assumes**  $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{alts} \Longrightarrow \text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } (R(i := Ri'))) \text{ (preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x)$

$\leq \text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } R) \text{ (preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x)$

**shows** *strongly-strategyproof-profile*  $R \ i \ Ri'$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *strongly-strategyproof-imp-not-manipulable*:

**assumes** *strongly-strategyproof-profile*  $R \ i \ Ri'$

**shows**  $\neg \text{manipulable-profile } R \ i \ Ri'$

*<proof>*

**end**

An SDS is strongly strategyproof if it is strongly strategyproof for all combinations of preference profiles, agents, and alternative preference relations.

**locale** *strongly-strategyproof-sds* = *social-decision-scheme* *agents* *alts* *sds*

**for** *agents* :: 'agent set **and** *alts* :: 'alt set **and** *sds* +

**assumes** *strongly-strategyproof*:

*is-pref-profile* *R*  $\implies$  *i*  $\in$  *agents*  $\implies$  *total-preorder-on* *alts* *Ri'*  $\implies$

*strongly-strategyproof-profile* *R* *i* *Ri'*

**begin**

Any SDS that is strongly strategyproof is also weakly strategyproof.

**sublocale** *strategyproof-sds*

*<proof>*

**end**

**locale** *strategyproof-an-sds* =

*strategyproof-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds* + *an-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds*

**for** *agents* :: 'agent set **and** *alts* :: 'alt set **and** *sds*

**end**

## 6 Lowering Social Decision Schemes

**theory** *SDS-Lowering*

**imports** *Social-Decision-Schemes*

**begin**

**definition** *lift-pref-profile* ::

'agent set  $\Rightarrow$  'alt set  $\Rightarrow$  'agent set  $\Rightarrow$  'alt set  $\Rightarrow$

('agent, 'alt) *pref-profile*  $\Rightarrow$  ('agent, 'alt) *pref-profile* **where**

*lift-pref-profile* *agents* *alts* *agents'* *alts'* *R* = ( $\lambda i$  *x* *y*.

*x*  $\in$  *alts'*  $\wedge$  *y*  $\in$  *alts'*  $\wedge$  *i*  $\in$  *agents'*  $\wedge$

(*x* = *y*  $\vee$  *x*  $\notin$  *alts*  $\vee$  *i*  $\notin$  *agents*  $\vee$  (*y*  $\in$  *alts*  $\wedge$  *R* *i* *x* *y*)))

**lemma** *lift-pref-profile-wf*:

**assumes** *pref-profile-wf* *agents* *alts* *R*

**assumes** *agents*  $\subseteq$  *agents'* *alts*  $\subseteq$  *alts'* *finite* *alts'*

**defines** *R'*  $\equiv$  *lift-pref-profile* *agents* *alts* *agents'* *alts'* *R*

**shows** *pref-profile-wf* *agents'* *alts'* *R'*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *lift-pref-profile-permute-agents*:

**assumes**  $\pi$  *permutes* *agents* *agents*  $\subseteq$  *agents'*

**shows**  $\text{lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' } (R \circ \pi) =$   
 $\text{lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' } R \circ \pi$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *lift-pref-profile-permute-alts:*

**assumes**  $\sigma$  permutes alts alts'  $\subseteq$  alts'

**shows**  $\text{lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' } (\text{permute-profile } \sigma R) =$   
 $\text{permute-profile } \sigma (\text{lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' } R)$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *lotteries-on-subset:*  $A \subseteq B \implies p \in \text{lotteries-on } A \implies p \in \text{lotteries-on } B$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *lottery-prob-carrier:*  $p \in \text{lotteries-on } A \implies \text{measure-pmf.prob } p A = 1$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**context**

**fixes** agents alts R agents' alts' R'

**assumes** R-wf: *pref-profile-wf agents alts R*

**assumes** *election: agents  $\subseteq$  agents' alts  $\subseteq$  alts' alts  $\neq$  {} agents  $\neq$  {} finite alts'*

**defines**  $R' \equiv \text{lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' } R$

**begin**

**interpretation** R: *pref-profile-wf agents alts R* ⟨proof⟩

**interpretation** R': *pref-profile-wf agents' alts' R'*  
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *lift-pref-profile-strict-iff:*

$x \prec[\text{lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' } R i] y \longleftrightarrow$   
 $i \in \text{agents} \wedge ((y \in \text{alts} \wedge x \in \text{alts}' - \text{alts}) \vee x \prec[R i] y)$

⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *preferred-alts-lift-pref-profile:*

**assumes**  $i: i \in \text{agents}'$  **and**  $x: x \in \text{alts}'$

**shows**  $\text{preferred-alts } (R' i) x =$   
 $(\text{if } i \in \text{agents} \wedge x \in \text{alts} \text{ then preferred-alts } (R i) x \text{ else alts}' )$

⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *lift-pref-profile-Pareto-iff:*

$x \preceq[\text{Pareto}(R')] y \longleftrightarrow x \in \text{alts}' \wedge y \in \text{alts}' \wedge (x \notin \text{alts} \vee x \preceq[\text{Pareto}(R)] y)$

⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *lift-pref-profile-Pareto-strict-iff:*

$x \prec[\text{Pareto}(R')] y \longleftrightarrow x \in \text{alts}' \wedge y \in \text{alts}' \wedge (x \notin \text{alts} \wedge y \in \text{alts} \vee x \prec[\text{Pareto}(R)] y)$

⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *pareto-losers-lift-pref-profile:*

**shows**  $\text{pareto-losers } R' = \text{pareto-losers } R \cup (\text{alts}' - \text{alts})$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**context**

**begin**

**private lemma** *lift-SD-iff-agent*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$  **and**  $i: i \in \text{agents}$

**shows**  $p \preceq[\text{SD}(R' i)] q \longleftrightarrow p \preceq[\text{SD}(R i)] q$

⟨proof⟩ **lemma** *lift-SD-iff-nonagent*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$  **and**  $i: i \in \text{agents}' - \text{agents}$

**shows**  $p \preceq[\text{SD}(R' i)] q$

⟨proof⟩

**lemmas**  $\text{lift-SD-iff} = \text{lift-SD-iff-agent lift-SD-iff-nonagent}$

**lemma** *lift-SD-iff'*:

$p \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \implies q \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \implies i \in \text{agents}' \implies$

$p \preceq[\text{SD}(R' i)] q \longleftrightarrow i \notin \text{agents} \vee p \preceq[\text{SD}(R i)] q$

⟨proof⟩

**end**

**lemma** *lift-SD-strict-iff*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$  **and**  $i: i \in \text{agents}$

**shows**  $p \prec[\text{SD}(R' i)] q \longleftrightarrow p \prec[\text{SD}(R i)] q$

⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *lift-Pareto-SD-iff*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**shows**  $p \preceq[\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R')] q \longleftrightarrow p \preceq[\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)] q$

⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *lift-Pareto-SD-strict-iff*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**shows**  $p \prec[\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R')] q \longleftrightarrow p \prec[\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)] q$

⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *lift-SD-efficient-iff*:

**assumes**  $p: p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

**shows**  $\text{SD-efficient } R' p \longleftrightarrow \text{SD-efficient } R p$

⟨proof⟩

**end**

**locale** *sds-lowering* =

*ex-post-efficient-sds agents alts sds*

**for** *agents* :: 'agent set **and** *alts* :: 'alt set **and** *sds* +

**fixes** *agents'* *alts'*

**assumes** *agents'-subset*:  $agents' \subseteq agents$  **and** *alts'-subset*:  $alts' \subseteq alts$   
**and** *agents'-nonempty* [*simp*]:  $agents' \neq \{\}$  **and** *alts'-nonempty* [*simp*]:  $alts' \neq \{\}$   
**begin**

**lemma** *finite-agents'* [*simp*]: *finite agents'*  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *finite-alts'* [*simp*]: *finite alts'*  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**abbreviation** *lift* :: ('agent, 'alt) *pref-profile*  $\Rightarrow$  ('agent, 'alt) *pref-profile* **where**  
*lift*  $\equiv$  *lift-pref-profile agents' alts' agents alts*

**definition** *lowered* :: ('agent, 'alt) *pref-profile*  $\Rightarrow$  'alt *lottery* **where**  
*lowered* = *sds*  $\circ$  *lift*

**lemma** *lift-wf* [*simp*, *intro*]:  
*pref-profile-wf agents' alts' R*  $\Longrightarrow$  *is-pref-profile (lift R)*  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**sublocale** *lowered*: *election agents' alts'*  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *preferred-alts-lift*:  
*lowered.is-pref-profile R*  $\Longrightarrow$   $i \in agents \Longrightarrow x \in alts \Longrightarrow$   
*preferred-alts (lift R i) x* =  
 (if  $i \in agents' \wedge x \in alts'$  then *preferred-alts (R i) x* else *alts*)  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *pareto-losers-lift*:  
*lowered.is-pref-profile R*  $\Longrightarrow$  *pareto-losers (lift R)* = *pareto-losers R*  $\cup$  (*alts* – *alts'*)  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *lowered-lotteries*: *lowered.lotteries*  $\subseteq$  *lotteries*  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**sublocale** *lowered*: *social-decision-scheme agents' alts' lowered*  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**sublocale** *ex-post-efficient-sds agents' alts' lowered*  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *lowered-in-lotteries* [*simp*]: *lowered.is-pref-profile R*  $\Longrightarrow$  *lowered R*  $\in$  *lotteries*  
 ⟨*proof*⟩

**end**

**locale** *sds-lowering-anonymous* =  
*anonymous-sds agents alts sds +*  
*sds-lowering agents alts sds agents' alts'*  
**for** *agents* :: '*agent set and alts* :: '*alt set and sds agents' alts'*  
**begin**

**sublocale** *lowered: anonymous-sds agents' alts' lowered*  
*<proof>*

**end**

**locale** *sds-lowering-neutral* =  
*neutral-sds agents alts sds +*  
*sds-lowering agents alts sds agents' alts'*  
**for** *agents* :: '*agent set and alts* :: '*alt set and sds agents' alts'*  
**begin**

**sublocale** *lowered: neutral-sds agents' alts' lowered*  
*<proof>*

**end**

**locale** *sds-lowering-sd-efficient* =  
*sd-efficient-sds agents alts sds +*  
*sds-lowering agents alts sds agents' alts'*  
**for** *agents* :: '*agent set and alts* :: '*alt set and sds agents' alts'*  
**begin**

**sublocale** *sd-efficient-sds agents' alts' lowered*  
*<proof>*

**end**

**locale** *sds-lowering-strategyproof* =  
*strategyproof-sds agents alts sds +*  
*sds-lowering agents alts sds agents' alts'*  
**for** *agents* :: '*agent set and alts* :: '*alt set and sds agents' alts'*  
**begin**

**sublocale** *strategyproof-sds agents' alts' lowered*  
*<proof>*

**end**

```

locale sds-lowering-anonymous-neutral-sdeff-stratproof =
  sds-lowering-anonymous + sds-lowering-neutral +
  sds-lowering-sd-efficient + sds-lowering-strategyproof

end

```

## 7 Random Dictatorship

```

theory Random-Dictatorship
imports
  Complex-Main
  Social-Decision-Schemes
begin

```

We define Random Dictatorship as a social decision scheme on total preorders (i.e. agents are allowed to have ties in their rankings) by first selecting an agent uniformly at random and then selecting one of that agents' most preferred alternatives uniformly at random. Note that this definition also works for weak preferences.

```

definition random-dictatorship :: 'agent set  $\Rightarrow$  'alt set  $\Rightarrow$  ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile
 $\Rightarrow$  'alt lottery where
  random-dictatorship-auxdef:
  random-dictatorship agents alts R =
    do {
      i  $\leftarrow$  pmf-of-set agents;
      pmf-of-set (Max-wrt-among (R i) alts)
    }

```

```

context election
begin

```

```

abbreviation RD :: ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile  $\Rightarrow$  'alt lottery where
  RD  $\equiv$  random-dictatorship agents alts

```

```

lemma random-dictatorship-def:
  assumes is-pref-profile R
  shows RD R =
    do {
      i  $\leftarrow$  pmf-of-set agents;
      pmf-of-set (favorites R i)
    }

```

*<proof>*

```

lemma random-dictatorship-unique-favorites:
  assumes is-pref-profile R has-unique-favorites R
  shows RD R = map-pmf (favorite R) (pmf-of-set agents)

```

*<proof>*

**lemma** *random-dictatorship-unique-favorites'*:  
**assumes** *is-pref-profile R has-unique-favorites R*  
**shows**  $RD\ R = pmf\text{-of-multiset}\ (image\text{-mset}\ (favorite\ R)\ (mset\text{-set}\ agents))$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *pmf-random-dictatorship*:  
**assumes** *is-pref-profile R*  
**shows**  $pmf\ (RD\ R)\ x =$   
 $(\sum\ i \in agents.\ indicator\ (favorites\ R\ i)\ x /$   
 $real\ (card\ (favorites\ R\ i))) / real\ (card\ agents)$   
*<proof>*

**sublocale** *RD: social-decision-scheme agents alts RD*  
*<proof>*

We now show that Random Dictatorship fulfils anonymity, neutrality, and strong strategyproofness. At the very least, this shows that the definitions of these notions are consistent.

## 7.1 Anonymity

The following proof is essentially the following: In Random Dictatorship, permuting the agents in the preference profile is the same as applying the permutation to the agent that was picked uniformly at random in the first step. However, uniform distributions are invariant under permutation, therefore the outcome is totally unchanged.

**sublocale** *RD: anonymous-sds agents alts RD*  
*<proof>*

## 7.2 Neutrality

The proof of neutrality is similar to that of anonymity. We have proven elsewhere that the most preferred alternatives of an agent in a profile with permuted alternatives are simply the image of the originally preferred alternatives. Since we pick one alternative from the most preferred alternatives of the selected agent uniformly at random, this means that we effectively pick an agent, then pick one of her most preferred alternatives, and then apply the permutation to that alternative, which is simply Random Dictatorship transformed with the permutation.

**sublocale** *RD: neutral-sds agents alts RD*  
*<proof>*

### 7.3 Strong strategyproofness

The argument for strategyproofness is quite simple: Since the preferences submitted by an agent  $i$  only influence the outcome when that agent is picked in the first process, it suffices to focus on this case. When the agent  $i$  submits her true preferences, the probability of obtaining a result at least as good as  $x$  (for any alternative  $x$ ) is 1, since the outcome will always be one of her most-preferred alternatives. Obviously, the probability of obtaining such a result cannot exceed 1 no matter what preferences she submits instead, and thus, RD is strategyproof.

**sublocale** *RD: strongly-strategyproof-sds agents alts RD*  
*<proof>*

**end**

**end**

## 8 Random Serial Dictatorship

**theory** *Random-Serial-Dictatorship*

**imports**

*Complex-Main*

*Social-Decision-Schemes*

*Random-Dictatorship*

**begin**

Random Serial Dictatorship is an anonymous, neutral, strongly strategyproof, and ex-post efficient Social Decision Scheme that extends Random Dictatorship to the domain of weak preferences.

We define RSD using a fold over a random permutation. Effectively, we choose a random order of the agents (in the form of a list) and then traverse that list from left to right, where each agent in turn removes all the alternatives that are not top-ranked among the remaining ones.

**definition** *random-serial-dictatorship* ::

*'agent set*  $\Rightarrow$  *'alt set*  $\Rightarrow$  (*'agent, 'alt*) *pref-profile*  $\Rightarrow$  *'alt lottery* **where**

*random-serial-dictatorship agents alts R =*

*fold-bind-random-permutation* ( $\lambda i$  *alts. Max-wrt-among* (*R i*) *alts*) *pmf-of-set alts agents*

The following two facts correspond give an alternative recursive definition to the above definition, which uses random permutations and list folding.

**lemma** *random-serial-dictatorship-empty* [*simp*]:

*random-serial-dictatorship* {} *alts R = pmf-of-set alts*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *random-serial-dictatorship-nonempty*:

*finite agents*  $\implies$  *agents*  $\neq \{\}$   $\implies$   
*random-serial-dictatorship agents alts R* =  
do {  
*i*  $\leftarrow$  *pmf-of-set agents*;  
*random-serial-dictatorship (agents - {i}) (Max-wrt-among (R i) alts) R*  
}  
⟨*proof*⟩

We define the RSD winners w.r.t. a given set of alternatives and a fixed permutation (i.e. list) of agents. In contrast to the above definition, the RSD winners are determined by traversing the list of agents from right to left. This may seem strange, but it makes induction much easier, since induction over *foldr* does not require generalisation over the set of alternatives and is therefore much easier than over *foldl*.

**definition** *rsd-winners where*

*rsd-winners R alts agents* = *foldr* ( $\lambda i$  *alts. Max-wrt-among (R i) alts*) *agents alts*

**lemma** *rsd-winners-empty [simp]*: *rsd-winners R alts []* = *alts*  
⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *rsd-winners-Cons [simp]*:

*rsd-winners R alts (i # agents)* = *Max-wrt-among (R i) (rsd-winners R alts agents)*  
⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *rsd-winners-map [simp]*:

*rsd-winners R alts (map f agents)* = *rsd-winners (R o f) alts agents*  
⟨*proof*⟩

There is now another alternative definition of RSD in terms of the RSD winners. This will mostly be used for induction.

**lemma** *random-serial-dictatorship-altdef*:

**assumes** *finite agents*  
**shows** *random-serial-dictatorship agents alts R* =  
do {  
*agents'*  $\leftarrow$  *pmf-of-set (permutations-of-set agents)*;  
*pmf-of-set (rsd-winners R alts agents')*  
}  
⟨*proof*⟩

The following lemma shows that folding from left to right yields the same distribution. This is probably the most commonly used definition in the literature, along with the recursive one.

**lemma** *random-serial-dictatorship-foldl*:

**assumes** *finite agents*  
**shows** *random-serial-dictatorship agents alts R* =  
do {

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{agents}' \leftarrow \text{pmf-of-set } (\text{permutations-of-set agents}); \\
\text{pmf-of-set } (\text{foldl } (\lambda \text{alts } i. \text{Max-wrt-among } (R \ i) \ \text{alts}) \ \text{alts agents}') \\
\} \\
\langle \text{proof} \rangle
\end{array}$$

## 8.1 Auxiliary facts about RSD

### 8.1.1 Pareto-equivalence classes

First of all, we introduce the auxiliary notion of a Pareto-equivalence class. A non-empty set of alternatives is a Pareto equivalence class if all agents are indifferent between all alternatives in it, and if some alternative  $x$  is contained in the set, any other alternative  $y$  is contained in it if and only if, to all agents,  $y$  is at least as good as  $x$ . The importance of this notion lies in the fact that the set of RSD winners is always a Pareto-equivalence class, which we will later use to show ex-post efficiency and strategy-proofness.

**definition** *RSD-pareto-eqclass* **where**

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{RSD-pareto-eqclass agents alts } R \ A \longleftrightarrow \\
A \neq \{\} \wedge A \subseteq \text{alts} \wedge (\forall x \in A. \forall y \in \text{alts}. y \in A \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in \text{agents}. R \ i \ x \ y))
\end{array}$$

**lemma** *RSD-pareto-eqclassI*:

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{assumes } A \neq \{\} \ A \subseteq \text{alts} \ \wedge x \ y. \ x \in A \implies y \in \text{alts} \implies y \in A \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in \text{agents}. \\
R \ i \ x \ y) \\
\text{shows } \text{RSD-pareto-eqclass agents alts } R \ A \\
\langle \text{proof} \rangle
\end{array}$$

**lemma** *RSD-pareto-eqclassD*:

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{assumes } \text{RSD-pareto-eqclass agents alts } R \ A \\
\text{shows } A \neq \{\} \ A \subseteq \text{alts} \ \wedge x \ y. \ x \in A \implies y \in \text{alts} \implies y \in A \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in \text{agents}. \\
R \ i \ x \ y) \\
\langle \text{proof} \rangle
\end{array}$$

**lemma** *RSD-pareto-eqclass-indiff-set*:

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{assumes } \text{RSD-pareto-eqclass agents alts } R \ A \ i \in \text{agents} \ x \in A \ y \in A \\
\text{shows } R \ i \ x \ y \\
\langle \text{proof} \rangle
\end{array}$$

**lemma** *RSD-pareto-eqclass-empty* [*simp, intro!*]:

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{alts} \neq \{\} \implies \text{RSD-pareto-eqclass } \{\} \ \text{alts } R \ \text{alts} \\
\langle \text{proof} \rangle
\end{array}$$

**lemma** (*in pref-profile-wf*) *RSD-pareto-eqclass-insert*:

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{assumes } \text{RSD-pareto-eqclass agents}' \ \text{alts } R \ A \ \text{finite alts} \\
\quad i \in \text{agents} \ \text{agents}' \subseteq \text{agents} \\
\text{shows } \text{RSD-pareto-eqclass } (\text{insert } i \ \text{agents}') \ \text{alts } R \ (\text{Max-wrt-among } (R \ i) \ A) \\
\langle \text{proof} \rangle
\end{array}$$

### 8.1.2 Facts about RSD winners

**context** *pref-profile-wf*  
**begin**

Any RSD winner is a valid alternative.

**lemma** *rsd-winners-subset*:  
**assumes** *set agents'  $\subseteq$  agents*  
**shows** *rsd-winners R alts' agents'  $\subseteq$  alts'*  
*<proof>*

There is always at least one RSD winner.

**lemma** *rsd-winners-nonempty*:  
**assumes** *finite: finite alts and alts'  $\neq$  {} set agents'  $\subseteq$  agents alts'  $\subseteq$  alts*  
**shows** *rsd-winners R alts' agents'  $\neq$  {}*  
*<proof>*

Obviously, the set of RSD winners is always finite.

**lemma** *rsd-winners-finite*:  
**assumes** *set agents'  $\subseteq$  agents finite alts alts'  $\subseteq$  alts*  
**shows** *finite (rsd-winners R alts' agents')*  
*<proof>*

**lemmas** *rsd-winners-wf =*  
*rsd-winners-subset rsd-winners-nonempty rsd-winners-finite*

The set of RSD winners is a Pareto-equivalence class.

**lemma** *RSD-pareto-eqclass-rsd-winners-aux*:  
**assumes** *finite: finite alts and alts  $\neq$  {} and set agents'  $\subseteq$  agents*  
**shows** *RSD-pareto-eqclass (set agents') alts R (rsd-winners R alts agents')*  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *RSD-pareto-eqclass-rsd-winners*:  
**assumes** *finite: finite alts and alts  $\neq$  {} and set agents' = agents*  
**shows** *RSD-pareto-eqclass agents alts R (rsd-winners R alts agents')*  
*<proof>*

For the proof of strategy-proofness, we need to define indifference sets and lift preference relations to sets in a specific way.

**context**  
**begin**

An indifference set for a given preference relation is a non-empty set of alternatives such that the agent is indifferent over all of them.

**private definition** *indiff-set* **where**  
*indiff-set S A  $\longleftrightarrow$  A  $\neq$  {}  $\wedge$  ( $\forall x \in A. \forall y \in A. S x y$ )*

**private lemma** *indiff-set-mono*:  $\text{indiff-set } S A \implies B \subseteq A \implies B \neq \{\} \implies \text{indiff-set } S B$

*\langle proof \rangle*

Given an arbitrary set of alternatives  $A$  and an indifference set  $B$ , we say that  $B$  is set-preferred over  $A$  w.r.t. the preference relation  $R$  if all (or, equivalently, any) of the alternatives in  $B$  are preferred over all alternatives in  $A$ .

**private definition** *RSD-set-rel* **where**

$\text{RSD-set-rel } S A B \longleftrightarrow \text{indiff-set } S B \wedge (\forall x \in A. \forall y \in B. S x y)$

The most-preferred alternatives (w.r.t.  $R$ ) among any non-empty set of alternatives form an indifference set w.r.t.  $R$ .

**private lemma** *indiff-set-Max-wrt-among*:

**assumes** *finite carrier*  $A \subseteq \text{carrier } A \neq \{\}$  *total-preorder-on carrier*  $S$

**shows**  $\text{indiff-set } S (\text{Max-wrt-among } S A)$

*\langle proof \rangle*

We now consider the set of RSD winners in the setting of a preference profile  $R$  and a manipulated profile  $R(i := Ri')$ . This theorem shows that the set of RSD winners in the outcome is either the same in both cases or the outcome for the truthful profile is an indifference set that is set-preferred over the outcome for the manipulated profile.

**lemma** *rsd-winners-manipulation-aux*:

**assumes** *wf*: *total-preorder-on alts*  $Ri'$

**and**  $i: i \in \text{agents}$  **and** *set agents'*  $\subseteq \text{agents}$  *finite agents*

**and** *finite*: *finite alts* **and**  $\text{alts} \neq \{\}$

**defines** *[simp]*:  $w' \equiv \text{rsd-winners } (R(i := Ri')) \text{ alts}$  **and** *[simp]*:  $w \equiv \text{rsd-winners } R \text{ alts}$

**shows**  $w' \text{ agents}' = w \text{ agents}' \vee \text{RSD-set-rel } (R i) (w' \text{ agents}') (w \text{ agents}')$

*\langle proof \rangle*

The following variant of the previous theorem is slightly easier to use. We eliminate the case where the two outcomes are the same by observing that the original outcome is then also set-preferred to the manipulated one. In essence, this means that no matter what manipulation is done, the original outcome is always set-preferred to the manipulated one.

**lemma** *rsd-winners-manipulation*:

**assumes** *wf*: *total-preorder-on alts*  $Ri'$

**and**  $i: i \in \text{agents}$  **and** *set agents'*  $= \text{agents}$  *finite agents*

**and** *finite*: *finite alts* **and**  $\text{alts} \neq \{\}$

**defines** *[simp]*:  $w' \equiv \text{rsd-winners } (R(i := Ri')) \text{ alts}$  **and** *[simp]*:  $w \equiv \text{rsd-winners } R \text{ alts}$

**shows**  $\forall x \in w' \text{ agents}'. \forall y \in w \text{ agents}'. x \preceq [R i] y$

*\langle proof \rangle*

**end**

The lottery that RSD yields is well-defined.

**lemma** *random-serial-dictatorship-support*:

**assumes** *finite agents finite alts agents'  $\subseteq$  agents alts'  $\neq \{\}$  alts'  $\subseteq$  alts*

**shows** *set-pmf (random-serial-dictatorship agents' alts' R)  $\subseteq$  alts'*

*<proof>*

Permutation of alternatives commutes with RSD winners.

**lemma** *rsd-winners-permute-profile*:

**assumes** *perm:  $\sigma$  permutes alts and set agents'  $\subseteq$  agents*

**shows** *rsd-winners (permute-profile  $\sigma$  R) alts agents' =  $\sigma$  ' rsd-winners R alts agents'*

*<proof>*

**lemma** *random-serial-dictatorship-singleton*:

**assumes** *finite agents finite alts agents'  $\subseteq$  agents  $x \in$  alts*

**shows** *random-serial-dictatorship agents' {x} R = return-pmf x (is ?d = -)*

*<proof>*

**end**

## 8.2 Proofs of properties

With all the facts that we have proven about the RSD winners, the hard work is mostly done. We can now simply fix some arbitrary order of the agents, apply the theorems about the RSD winners, and show the properties we want to show without doing much reasoning about probabilities.

**context** *election*

**begin**

**abbreviation** *RSD  $\equiv$  random-serial-dictatorship agents alts*

### 8.2.1 Well-definedness

**sublocale** *RSD: social-decision-scheme agents alts RSD*

*<proof>*

### 8.2.2 RD extension

**lemma** *RSD-extends-RD*:

**assumes** *wf: is-pref-profile R and unique: has-unique-favorites R*

**shows** *RSD R = RD R*

*<proof>*

### 8.2.3 Anonymity

Anonymity is a direct consequence of the fact that we randomise over all permutations in a uniform way.

**sublocale** *RSD: anonymous-sds agents alts RSD*  
(*proof*)

#### 8.2.4 Neutrality

Neutrality follows from the fact that the RSD winners of a permuted profile are simply the image of the original RSD winners under the permutation.

**sublocale** *RSD: neutral-sds agents alts RSD*  
(*proof*)

#### 8.2.5 Ex-post efficiency

Ex-post efficiency follows from the fact that the set of RSD winners is a Pareto-equivalence class.

**sublocale** *RSD: ex-post-efficient-sds agents alts RSD*  
(*proof*)

#### 8.2.6 Strong strategy-proofness

Strong strategy-proofness is slightly more difficult to show. We have already shown that the set of RSD winners for the truthful profile is always set-preferred (by the manipulating agent) to the RSD winners for the manipulated profile. This can now be used to show strategy-proofness: We recall that the set of RSD winners is always an indifference class. Therefore, given any fixed alternative  $x$  and considering a fixed order of the agents, either all of the RSD winners in the original profile are at least as good as  $x$  or none of them are, and, since the original RSD winners are set-preferred to the manipulated ones, none of the RSD winners in the manipulated case are at least as good than  $x$  either in that case. This means that for a fixed order of agents, either the probability that the original outcome is at least as good as  $x$  is 1 or the probability that the manipulated outcome is at least as good as  $x$  is 0. Therefore, the original lottery is clearly SD-preferred to the manipulated one.

**sublocale** *RSD: strongly-strategyproof-sds agents alts RSD*  
(*proof*)

**end**

**end**

**theory** *Randomised-Social-Choice*

**imports**

*Complex-Main*

*SDS-Lowering*

*Random-Dictatorship*

*Random-Serial-Dictatorship*

**begin**

end

## 9 Automatic definition of Preference Profiles

**theory** *Preference-Profile-Cmd*

**imports**

*Complex-Main*

*../Elections*

**keywords**

*preference-profile :: thy-goal*

**begin**

$\langle ML \rangle$

**context** *election*

**begin**

**lemma** *preferred-alts-prefs-from-table:*

**assumes** *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs i*  $\in$  *set (map fst xs)*

**shows** *preferred-alts (prefs-from-table xs i) x =*  
*of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge (rev (the (map-of xs i))) x*

$\langle proof \rangle$

**lemma** *favorites-prefs-from-table:*

**assumes** *wf: prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs* **and** *i: i*  $\in$  *agents*

**shows** *favorites (prefs-from-table xs) i = hd (the (map-of xs i))*

$\langle proof \rangle$

**lemma** *has-unique-favorites-prefs-from-table:*

**assumes** *wf: prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs*

**shows** *has-unique-favorites (prefs-from-table xs) =*  
*list-all ( $\lambda z. is-singleton (hd (snd z))$ ) xs*

$\langle proof \rangle$

end

### 9.1 Automatic definition of preference profiles from tables

**function** *favorites-prefs-from-table* **where**

*i = j*  $\implies$  *favorites-prefs-from-table ((j,x)#xs) i = hd x*

| *i*  $\neq$  *j*  $\implies$  *favorites-prefs-from-table ((j,x)#xs) i =*  
*favorites-prefs-from-table xs i*

| *favorites-prefs-from-table [] i = {}*

$\langle proof \rangle$

**termination**  $\langle proof \rangle$

**lemma** (**in** *election*) *eval-favorites-prefs-from-table:*

**assumes** *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs*  
**shows** *favorites-prefs-from-table xs i =*  
*favorites (prefs-from-table xs) i*  
⟨*proof*⟩

**function** *weak-ranking-prefs-from-table* **where**  
*i ≠ j ⇒ weak-ranking-prefs-from-table ((i,x)#xs) j = weak-ranking-prefs-from-table*  
*xs j*  
| *i = j ⇒ weak-ranking-prefs-from-table ((i,x)#xs) j = x*  
| *weak-ranking-prefs-from-table [] j = []*  
⟨*proof*⟩  
**termination** ⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *eval-weak-ranking-prefs-from-table*:  
**assumes** *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs*  
**shows** *weak-ranking-prefs-from-table xs i = weak-ranking (prefs-from-table xs*  
*i)*  
⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *eval-prefs-from-table-aux*:  
**assumes** *R ≡ prefs-from-table xs prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs*  
**shows** *R i a b ⟷ prefs-from-table xs i a b*  
*a <[R i] b ⟷ prefs-from-table xs i a b ∧ ¬prefs-from-table xs i b a*  
*anonymous-profile R = mset (map snd xs)*  
*election agents alts ⇒ i ∈ set (map fst xs) ⇒*  
*preferred-alts (R i) x =*  
*of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge (rev (the (map-of xs i))) x*  
*election agents alts ⇒ i ∈ set (map fst xs) ⇒*  
*favorites R i = favorites-prefs-from-table xs i*  
*election agents alts ⇒ i ∈ set (map fst xs) ⇒*  
*weak-ranking (R i) = weak-ranking-prefs-from-table xs i*  
*election agents alts ⇒ i ∈ set (map fst xs) ⇒*  
*favorite R i = the-elem (favorites-prefs-from-table xs i)*  
*election agents alts ⇒*  
*has-unique-favorites R ⟷ list-all (λz. is-singleton (hd (snd z))) xs*  
⟨*proof*⟩

**lemma** *pref-profile-from-tableI'*:  
**assumes** *R1 ≡ prefs-from-table xss prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss*  
**shows** *pref-profile-wf agents alts R1*  
⟨*proof*⟩

⟨*ML*⟩

**end**  
**theory** *QSOpt-Exact*  
**imports** *Complex-Main*  
**begin**

$\langle ML \rangle$

end

## 10 Automatic Fact Gathering for Social Decision Schemes

```
theory SDS-Automation
  imports
    Preference-Profile-Cmd
    QSOpt-Exact
    ../Social-Decision-Schemes
  keywords
    derive-orbit-equations
    derive-support-conditions
    derive-ex-post-conditions
    find-inefficient-supports
    prove-inefficient-supports
    derive-strategyproofness-conditions :: thy-goal
begin
```

We now provide the following commands to automatically derive restrictions on the results of Social Decision Schemes satisfying Anonymity, Neutrality, Efficiency, or Strategy-Proofness:

**derive-orbit-equations** to derive equalities arising from automorphisms of the given profiles due to Anonymity and Neutrality

**derive-ex-post-conditions** to find all Pareto losers and the given profiles and derive the facts that they must be assigned probability 0 by any *ex-post*-efficient SDS

**find-inefficient-supports** to use Linear Programming to find all minimal SD-inefficient (but not *ex-post*-inefficient) supports in the given profiles and output a corresponding witness lottery for each of them

**prove-inefficient-supports** to prove a specified set of support conditions arising from *ex-post*- or *SD*-Efficiency. For conditions arising from *SD*-Efficiency, a witness lottery must be specified (e.g. as computed by **derive-orbit-equations**).

**derive-support-conditions** to automatically find and prove all support conditions arising from *ex-post*- and *SD*-Efficiency

**derive-strategyproofness-conditions** to automatically derive all conditions arising from weak Strategy-Proofness and any manipulations between the given preference profiles. An optional maximum manipulation size can be specified.

All commands except **find-inefficient-supports** open a proof state and leave behind proof obligations for the user to discharge. This should always be possible using the Simplifier, possibly with a few additional rules, depending on the context.

**lemma** *disj-False-right*:  $P \vee \text{False} \longleftrightarrow P$   $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemmas** *multiset-add-ac* = *add-ac*[**where**  $?'a = 'a$  *multiset*]

**lemma** *less-or-eq-real*:

$(x::\text{real}) < y \vee x = y \longleftrightarrow x \leq y$   $x < y \vee y = x \longleftrightarrow x \leq y$   $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *multiset-Diff-single-normalize*:

**fixes**  $a\ c$  **assumes**  $a \neq c$

**shows**  $(\{\#a\} + B) - \{\#c\} = \{\#a\} + (B - \{\#c\})$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *ex-post-efficient-aux*:

**assumes** *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss*  $R \equiv \text{prefs-from-table } xss$

**assumes**  $i \in \text{agents} \forall i \in \text{agents}. y \succeq_{[\text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i]} x \neg y \preceq_{[\text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i]} x$

**shows** *ex-post-efficient-sds agents alts sds*  $\longrightarrow \text{pmf } (sds\ R)\ x = 0$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma** *SD-inefficient-support-aux*:

**assumes**  $R: \text{prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss } R \equiv \text{prefs-from-table } xss$

**assumes**  $as: as \neq [] \text{ set } as \subseteq \text{alts distinct } as\ A = \text{set } as$

**assumes**  $ys: \forall x \in \text{set } (map\ snd\ ys). 0 \leq x \text{ sum-list } (map\ snd\ ys) = 1 \text{ set } (map\ fst\ ys) \subseteq \text{alts}$

**assumes**  $i: i \in \text{agents}$

**assumes**  $SD1: \forall i \in \text{agents}. \forall x \in \text{alts}.$

$\text{sum-list } (map\ snd\ (filter\ (\lambda y. \text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i\ x\ (fst\ y))\ ys)) \geq$

$\text{real } (length\ (filter\ (\text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i\ x)\ as)) / \text{real } (length\ as)$

**assumes**  $SD2: \exists x \in \text{alts}. \text{sum-list } (map\ snd\ (filter\ (\lambda y. \text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i\ x\ (fst\ y))\ ys)) >$

$\text{real } (length\ (filter\ (\text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i\ x)\ as)) / \text{real } (length\ as)$

**shows** *sd-efficient-sds agents alts sds*  $\longrightarrow (\exists x \in A. \text{pmf } (sds\ R)\ x = 0)$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**definition** *pref-classes* **where**

*pref-classes*  $\text{alts } le = \text{preferred-alt s } le \text{ 'alts } - \{\text{alts}\}$

**primrec** *pref-classes-lists* **where**

*pref-classes-lists* [] = {}  
| *pref-classes-lists* (xs#xss) = insert (∪(set (xs#xss))) (*pref-classes-lists* xss)

**fun** *pref-classes-lists-aux* **where**

*pref-classes-lists-aux* acc [] = {}  
| *pref-classes-lists-aux* acc (xs#xss) = insert acc (*pref-classes-lists-aux* (acc ∪ xs) xss)

**lemma** *pref-classes-lists-append*:

*pref-classes-lists* (xs @ ys) = (∪) (∪(set ys)) ‘ *pref-classes-lists* xs ∪ *pref-classes-lists* ys  
{proof}

**lemma** *pref-classes-lists-aux*:

**assumes** *is-weak-ranking* xss acc ∩ (∪(set xss)) = {}  
**shows** *pref-classes-lists-aux* acc xss =  
(insert acc ((λA. A ∪ acc) ‘ *pref-classes-lists* (rev xss)) – {acc ∪ ∪(set xss)})  
{proof}

**lemma** *pref-classes-list-aux-hd-tl*:

**assumes** *is-weak-ranking* xss xss ≠ []  
**shows** *pref-classes-lists-aux* (hd xss) (tl xss) = *pref-classes-lists* (rev xss) – {∪(set xss)}  
{proof}

**lemma** *pref-classes-of-weak-ranking-aux*:

**assumes** *is-weak-ranking* xss  
**shows** *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge* xss ‘ (∪(set xss)) = *pref-classes-lists* xss  
{proof}

**lemma** *eval-pref-classes-of-weak-ranking*:

**assumes** ∪(set xss) = alts *is-weak-ranking* xss alts ≠ {}  
**shows** *pref-classes* alts (*of-weak-ranking* xss) = *pref-classes-lists-aux* (hd xss) (tl xss)  
{proof}

**context** *preorder-on*

**begin**

**lemma** *SD-iff-pref-classes*:

**assumes**  $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier } q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$   
**shows**  $p \preceq[\text{SD}(le)] q \iff$   
( $\forall A \in \text{pref-classes carrier } le. \text{measure-pmf.prob } p A \leq \text{measure-pmf.prob } q A$ )  
{proof}

**end**

**lemma** (in *strategyproof-an-sds*) *strategyproof'*:

**assumes** *wf*: *is-pref-profile* *R* *total-preorder-on* *alts* *Ri'* **and** *i*: *i* ∈ *agents*  
**shows**  $(\exists A \in \text{pref-classes } \text{alts } (R \ i). \text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } (R(i := Ri')))) \ A <$   
 $\text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } R) \ A) \vee$   
 $(\forall A \in \text{pref-classes } \text{alts } (R \ i). \text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } (R(i := Ri')))) \ A =$   
 $\text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } R) \ A)$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *pref-classes-lists-aux-finite*:

$A \in \text{pref-classes-lists-aux } \text{acc } \text{xss} \implies \text{finite } \text{acc} \implies (\bigwedge A. A \in \text{set } \text{xss} \implies \text{finite } A)$   
 $\implies \text{finite } A$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *strategyproof-aux*:

**assumes** *wf*: *prefs-from-table-wf* *agents* *alts* *xss1* *R1* = *prefs-from-table* *xss1*  
*prefs-from-table-wf* *agents* *alts* *xss2* *R2* = *prefs-from-table* *xss2*  
**assumes** *sds*: *strategyproof-an-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds* **and** *i*: *i* ∈ *agents* **and** *j*: *j* ∈ *agents*  
**assumes** *eq*:  $R1(i := R2 \ j) = R2 \ \text{the } (\text{map-of } \text{xss1 } \ i) = \text{xs}$   
*pref-classes-lists-aux* (*hd* *xs*) (*tl* *xs*) = *ps*  
**shows**  $(\exists A \in \text{ps}. (\sum x \in A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R2) \ x) < (\sum x \in A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R1) \ x)) \vee$   
 $(\forall A \in \text{ps}. (\sum x \in A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R2) \ x) = (\sum x \in A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R1) \ x))$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *strategyproof-aux'*:

**assumes** *wf*: *prefs-from-table-wf* *agents* *alts* *xss1* *R1* ≡ *prefs-from-table* *xss1*  
*prefs-from-table-wf* *agents* *alts* *xss2* *R2* ≡ *prefs-from-table* *xss2*  
**assumes** *sds*: *strategyproof-an-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds* **and** *i*: *i* ∈ *agents* **and** *j*: *j* ∈ *agents*  
**assumes** *perm*: *list-permutes* *ys* *alts*  
**defines**  $\sigma \equiv \text{permutation-of-list } \text{ys}$  **and**  $\sigma' \equiv \text{inverse-permutation-of-list } \text{ys}$   
**defines**  $\text{xs} \equiv \text{the } (\text{map-of } \text{xss1 } \ i)$   
**defines**  $\text{xs}' : \text{xs}' \equiv \text{map } ((\cdot) \ \sigma) \ (\text{the } (\text{map-of } \text{xss2 } \ j))$   
**defines**  $Ri' \equiv \text{of-weak-ranking } \text{xs}'$   
**assumes** *distinct-ps*:  $\forall A \in \text{ps}. \text{distinct } A$   
**assumes** *eq*:  $\text{mset } (\text{map } \text{snd } \text{xss1}) - \{\#\text{the } (\text{map-of } \text{xss1 } \ i)\#\} + \{\#\text{xs}'\#\} =$   
 $\text{mset } (\text{map } (\text{map } ((\cdot) \ \sigma) \circ \text{snd}) \ \text{xss2})$   
*pref-classes-lists-aux* (*hd* *xs*) (*tl* *xs*) = *set* ' *ps*  
**shows** *list-permutes* *ys* *alts* ∧  
 $((\exists A \in \text{ps}. (\sum x \leftarrow A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R2) \ (\sigma' \ x)) < (\sum x \leftarrow A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R1) \ x))$   
 $\vee$   
 $(\forall A \in \text{ps}. (\sum x \leftarrow A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R2) \ (\sigma' \ x)) = (\sum x \leftarrow A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R1) \ x)))$   
*<proof>*

$\langle ML \rangle$

**end**

## References

- [1] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Geist. Proving the incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT solving. *Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, 2016. Forthcoming.